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INTRODUCTION

Reform of the federal criminal law is a project of awesome scope and
complexity entailing not merely legal considerations but also sensitivity to
history, politics, social psychology, penology and the religious, ethnic and
economic tensions within this nation. The reform project must conform with
that remarkable structure for resolving tensions, the Constitution of the
United States. It is difficult enough to coordinate the wills of 220 million
Americans in regard to even one of the many emotion-stirring issues of
penal law, such as capital punishment, gun control, abortion, obscenity,
probation, parole, organized crime, traffic in narcotic and other drugs,
espionage, riot control, wire-tapping or bail. To bring Congress to agreement simultaneously on a myriad of changes, each of which will be regarded
by some as progress and by others as catastrophe, would appear to require a
political miracle. Why should such a Herculean task be undertaken? What is
the main direction of reform? What are the toughest issues to resolve, the
chief obstacles to be overcome? What are the prospects?
This Article will describe the reform project in the setting of controversy: the clash between three versions of reform. The first was the Proposed
Federal Criminal Code recommended in the Final Report of the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. That Commission will
be referred to herein as the Brown Commission, after its Chairman, Governor Edmund G. Brown of California. Its proposed code will be referred to as
the Commission Code.
A second version of the reform was embodied in bills numbered S. 1 in
the Ninety-third and Ninety-fourth Congresses. This version was sponsored
chiefly by Senators McClellan of Arkansas and Hruska of Nebraska, conservative members of the Brown Commission and dominant members of the
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary. The supporters of this bill will occasionally be referred to
as "the Right." Following submission of the Brown Commission Report to
Congress and the President, the Subcommittee held extensive hearings' and
published a three-volume proposed Report of the Judiciary Committee, of
which Volume I is S. 1 of the Ninety-fourth Congress, the version of S. 1
usually referred to in this Article. That version of S. 1 was a blend of the
original S. 12 and S. 1400,3 which was the Administration bill prepared by
the Department of Justice. S. 1 closely resembled the Commission Code in
form and in most of its substance, but it was overlaid by numerous "hard1. See SUBCOMMI-IrEE HEARINGS.
2. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprintedin SUBCOMMITrEE HEARINGS, Part V, at 4211
(1973).
3. S. 1400, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), reprintedin SUBCOMMITrEE HEARINGS, Part V, at
4862 (1973); see id. at 4205 (remarks of Senator McClellan).
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line" changes that evoked powerful opposition. The latest bill, that of
January 15, 1975, is the version reported by the Subcommittee to the full
Committee on the Judiciary, and has itself been modified by numerous
subsequent proposed and agreed changes. Since it was clearly a draft in
transition, it seems advantageous to focus on the earlier version, highlighting the issues it posed starkly.
I summarized my reaction to S. 1 as follows in a memorandum on
"Shortcomings of the McClellan Bill, S. 1":
It can be said generally of the contrasts between S. 1 and the
Brown Commission proposals 'that S. 1 expresses the view that the
crime problem can and should be solved by extending government's
power over individuals. This extension can take the form of wiretapping and other secret surveillance, of giving broad discretion to officials in decisions about punishment, of authorizing exceptionally severe sentences, or of restricting access to critical information about
government operations. The other school of thought, represented by
the Brown Commission, is skeptical about the gains in law enforcement
that can be expected from such measures, and more concerned about
4
impairing the quality of civil life by needless restraints on liberty.
Contrary to the position of "the Left" described below, however, I believed
that S. 1 contained much that was valuable, derived from the Brown
Commission, and that the repugnant provisions of S. 1 could easily be
excised by amendment.
The third version of penal reform was that of the National Committee
Against Repressive Legislation (NCARL) and the American Civil Liberties
Union, strongly supported by the National Lawyers Guild. I shall refer to
this group as "the Left." The Left's version was only belatedly drafted in
bill form5 because the Left's political position was that S. 1 was so pervasively reactionary that it could not be saved by amendment; yet their bills
were inevitably and obviously revisions of S. 1. No hearings were held or
scheduled on these bills. Basically, the Left did not push an alternative
reform; it concentrated on a campaign to stop S. 1.
II.

ORGANIZATION AND GOALS OF REFORM

A.

Organizationfor Reform
As I presently see it-for I came to this formulation near the end of my
twenty-year involvement in penal reform rather than at the beginning-the
main goal of penal reform is to promote respectfor the law by making law
respectable. This means that the reform must provide for fairer and more
4. Schwartz, CriminalCode: Shortcomings of the McClellan Bill, S. 1, 17 CRIM. L. REP.
(BNA) 3203 (July 16, 1975), reprintedin SUBCOMMITrEE HEARINGS, Part XII, at 384 (1975).
5. H.R. 10850, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 12504, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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effective administration of justice in accordance with modern ideas. Obsolete offenses must be eliminated; inconsistent penalties must be reconciled;
opportunities for arbitrary action must be narrowed; technical obstacles to
conviction must be suppressed; severe penalties must be provided (and
reserved) for offenses which today pose the greatest threats to society. In
addition, the purview of the F.B.I. and the rest of the massive machinery of
federal justice must be restricted to criminality of national significance,
leaving responsibility for local law and order to the states and local communities.
A few concrete illustrations of the foregoing generalizations will clarify
the meaning of "making the law respectable." Under current law, which
provides no guidelines for sentencing and no appeal against arbitrary sentence, two men who have committed identical offenses may find themselves
in adjoining federal prison cells serving outrageously different sentences,
while a third like offender is granted probation and never goes to prison at
all. Similarly, under current law a man who perpetrates a vast fraud, in the
course of which he sends a letter through the United States mail, is liable to
a maximum federal penalty of five years; 6 another swindler whose loot is
petty but who in the course of the scheme sends three letters is subject to a
maximum of three times five years, or fifteen years. 7 Current federal rape
legislation does not differentiate between savage attacks by strangers and
so-called "date-rape," that is, intercourse between voluntary companions
which may indeed have been forced but only following tolerated sexual
foreplay. s Finally, trivial involvement of the telephone or other instrumentality of interstate commerce makes a "federal case" of innumerable petty
local misdemeanors. Such grotesqueries undermine belief in the rationality
of the system, and encourage the view that there is nothing immoral in
trying to beat the system, whether the attempt is made by offenders or by
defense lawyers.
The urge to make criminal law intellectually respectable by replacing
the absurdities and anachronisms of prevailing law with rationality and
consistency was expressed in the Model Penal Code of the American Law
Institute. 9 The Model Penal Code triggered a powerful movement for reform
of the state criminal codes'0 and was a progenitor of the federal reform.
Many criticisms of current penal law had been documented in The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, the landmark Report of the President's
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
7.

See note 74 infra.

8. See 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1970).
9.

See MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).

10. See SUBCOMMITrEE HEARINGS, Part II, at 558-59 (1971) (remarks of Professor Wechsler
reporting on the status of state penal law revision); Wechsler, Codification of CrimninalLaw in
the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1425 (1968).
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Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.' 1 A
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws was established
by Congress in 1966,12 in response to pressure on the Johnson administration to "do something" about the "crime wave." The statute directed the
Commission to carry out:
a full and complete review and study of the statutory and case law of
the United States which constitutes the federal system of criminal
justice for the purpose of formulating and recommending to the Congress legislation which would improve the federal system of criminal
justice. It shall be the further duty of the Commission to make recommendations for revision and recodification of the criminal laws of the
United States, including repeal of unnecessary or undesirable statutes
and such changes in the penalty structure as the Commission may feel
will better serve the ends of justice.13
The bipartisan Commission was composed of three members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee (Senators McClellan, Hruska and Ervin), three
members of the House Judiciary Committee (Representatives Kastenmeier
of Wisconsin, Poff of Virginia and Edwards of California, later replaced by
Mikva of Illinois), three federal judges (Judges Edwards of the Sixth
Circuit, Higginbotham of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and MacBride of the Eastern District of California) and three Presidential appointees
(former Governor Brown and attorneys Donald Scott Thomas of Austin,
Texas and Theodore Voorhees of Washington, D.C.). 14
There was a fifteen-member Advisory Committee, headed by former
Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark. Among the
Advisors were prosecutors, defense lawyers, police officials and experts in
penology and constitutional law.' 5 Elliot L. Richardson, who had been U.S.
Attorney in Boston and Attorney General of Massachusetts before going on
to Cabinet and ambassadorial posts, was a member and spoke eloquently for
reform. 16 Leading members of the staff were likewise experienced pro11. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).

12. Pub. L. No. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516 (1966).

13. Id. § 3.

14. For biographical summaries and identification of other members who served for a time,
see COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, Appendix B, at 361.
15. See COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, Appendix C, at 363.
16. In a speech to an Orientation Conference of U.S. Attorneys in Washington, on August

1, 1969, he related the mounting problem of criminal law enforcement to a general erosion of
authority, whether of parents or governments, and to over-extension of penal prohibitions into
areas of private morals. He concluded:
The ultimate test must lie in the law's capacity to enlist rational understanding
and voluntary compliance. It is through applying this test that a body such as the

National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, for which I had the
privilege of serving on the Advisory Committee, renders its most important service. . ..
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secutors and defense lawyers. 17 Staff work was supplemented by special
reports from expert consultants of every shade of opinion on particularly
difficult issues. 18
Perhaps the most important preliminary decision of the Brown Commission was to recognize a disparity between the breadth of the statutory
mandate and the three-year deadline which Congress set for the Commission. Interpreting the broad scope of the mandate as defining a range within
which the Commission could select the most useful projects, I proposed, as
Director of the Commission, that we draft a new federal substantive code.
This meant that we would lay aside the divisive procedural issues, such as
wire-tapping, over which Congress had fiercely and recently debated.1 9 It
was evident that if we undertook to recanvass these issues we would spend
three years continuing a recent acrimonious debate, and in the end say
nothing new or authoritative.
The three-year deadline imposed a healthy urgency upon the Commission's work: we would do the best we could in the available time, abjuring
the extensions that such projects are typically afforded. 20 There are no
natural limits to an enterprise of this sort, and perfection is an illusory goal.
The Germans, for example, spent about a century attempting to perfect their
proposed penal code. 2 1 The American Law Institute deliberated for almost
two decades on the Model Penal Code without even reaching such difficult
matters as drug control, gambling, organized crime, political offenses and
regulatory offenses. Commentaries to the Model Penal Code have not yet
been published, mainly because it has proved impossible to keep up with the
immense flux of penal developments in Congress and the fifty states,
developments which seemingly should be related to the Code text. The
efforts that had gone into the Model Penal Code saved us years of original
work. We treated the Model Penal Code as a presumptively acceptable
a . . Having recognized that rationality and the skepticism which it has generated have contributed to the erosion of our system of order, we find in the end that
our only sensible course is to invoke a deeper skepticism and a more constructive
rationality. For it will take skepticism to identify those parts of the system that no
longer make sense in a modern society, and it will take rationality to strengthen those
elements of the system that are necessary to decent order among us.
STUDY DRAFT lxiv.

17. The Director had been a section chief in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice. Deputy Director Richard A. Green had extensive experience as Assistant U.S.
Attorney in the Southern District of New York, and thereafter as a defense attorney.
18.

See 1, 2 COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS.

19. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520
(1970); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1970).
20. A one-year extension plus a sixty-day wind-up period was granted, Pub.L. No. 91-39,
83 Stat. 44 (1969), allowing us time to take account of public response to the Study Draft which,
due to printing delays, was not widely circulated until June, 1970. The extension also compen-

sated for the six months required to organize the Commission and its staff.
21.

See A. SCH6NKE & H. SCHR6DER, STRAFGMESETBUCH-KoMMENTAR 1-5 (8th ed. 1976).
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tentative draft for a federal penal code, and drew heavily from the comments
in the tentative drafts. 22
Different groups have disparate goals, which in a democracy must be
compromised and periodically rebalanced. As the community's economic,
social and ethical character evolves, the "perfect" code, promulgated after
ten or twenty-five years of deliberation, will already be obsolescent. 23 The
need, then, is to inject into the political and legislative consciousness the
maximum feasible dose of accumulated knowledge and skill, rather than to
engage in interminable philosophical and sociological inquiries.
An additional benefit of a relatively short deadline is that it tends to
give the draftsmen a useful lead over the political forces which will eventually be marshalled against innovation. The California reform experience is
enlightening in this connection. Before a draft could be completed, the
project was aborted by politicians fearful of the possible electoral consequences of proposals to decriminalize private adult sexual behavior and use
of marijuana. 24 A protracted reform process makes each issue stand out as
crucial, deprives particular proposals of the logical support provided by the
entire context of the code, and magnifies the effectiveness of single-issue
opposition groups, who are happy to hold a comprehensive reform hostage
to satisfaction of their narrow concerns.
The three-year deadline also meant that we would not spend our time
and the government's money trying to identify "the cause of crime." This
decision seems so obviously correct as to be hardly worth mention, except
for a criticism voiced in one quarter that the Commission should have begun
its work with the sociological investigation. 25 Criminal law reform has, and
22. An excellent review of state experience in drafting reform codes appears in SUBCOMmiTTEE HEARINGS, Part I (1971).
23. Consider, for example, the rapid evolution of views regarding the application of
criminal law to private sexual relations and abortion. In 1959, the American Law Institute made
the moderately liberal proposal to legalize abortions where a physician, with the concurrence of
another doctor, believes "there is a substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother or that the child would be born with
grave physical or mental defect ..
"MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).

Although this proposal evoked conservative outrage at the time, it later proved to be unconstitutionally restrictive. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing woman's right to

abortion for any reason during first trimester of pregnancy).
24. See Sherry, CriminalLaw Revision in California, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 429 (1971),
reprintedin SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part II, at 623 (1971); Skolnick, Impediments to Criminal
Law Reform: California, 1963-70, in SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part II, at 654 (1971); Letter of
Professor Herbert T. Packer, 22 STAN. L. REV. 160 (1969); FortheRecord,17 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
vii (1969) (unbound volume only).
25. The Report of the Special Committee on the Proposed New Federal Criminal Law of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on the Brown Commission Code began with
a criticism that "without an investigation of the agonizing root causes of crime, an effective
penal code cannot be constructed." SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part III, subpt. D., at 3478
(1972). See N.Y. Times, July 5, 1972, at 27, col. 5. Despite this introduction to its Report, the
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I dare say ever will have, a full agenda if it addresses itself to manifest
abuses, inequalities, cruelties and anachronisms. Centuries of investigation
into the etiology of crime have produced a marvelous array of explanations,
including genetic defect, family disorganization, psychosexual compulsions, capitalist oppression, peer group pressures, the criminogenic tendencies of the penal system itself and, no doubt among fringe groups, sunspots
and diet. The lawyer-legislator cannot wait for the conclusion of this endless
effort of humanity to psychoanalyze itself. The practical question facing

those responsible for legislation and government is what can we do meanwhile, before we know definitely either what causes crime in general or the
particular cause for each of the infinite variety of crimes.
Early on, we decided to publish a preliminary study draft. 26 The
reasons were legal, political and strategic. The legal and political aspects
can be passed over quickly. Our enabling legislation called for "interim
reports to the President and the Congress at such times as the Commission
may deem appropriate, and in any event within two years . ...27 The

Study Draft was our compliance. 28 For political reasons-and I do not use
the phrase pejoratively-the Commission had to afford opportunity for
pre-publication comment on our code by legislators, judges, prosecutors,
the organized bar, government agencies and lobbyists of all sorts. The Study

Draft provided that formal opportunity. This publication can be characterized more as political necessity than information-gathering because the
Commission expected and received little new information after publication
of the Study Draft; earlier informal staff contacts and the experience of
Commission members, staff and the Advisory Committee had covered the
ground.
Association's position was quite favorable to the Commission's proposals, while offering a
number of carefully considered criticisms of particular provisions.
26. STUDY DAFr.For a statement of the aims and main features of the draft, see id. at
xxv. The draft was introduced to the legal community by a series of articles. See Brown &
Schwartz, New Federal Criminal Code is Submitted, 56 A.B.A.J. 844 (1970), reprinted in
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part I, at 50 (1971); Brown & Schwartz, Sentencing UndertheDraft
Federal Code, 56 A.B.A.J. 935 (1970), reprinted in SUBcoMMnrrEE HEARINGS, Part 1, at 56
(1971); Brown & Schwartz, Offenses Redefined Under Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 56
A.B.A.J. 1181 (1970), reprinted in SUBCOMMITrEE HEARINGS, Part I, at 78 (1971); McClellan,
Codification, Reform and Revision: The Challenge of a Modern FederalCriminal Code, 1971
DUKE L.J. 663.

27. Pub L. No. 89-801, § 8, 80 Stat. 1516 (1966).
28. The Commission filed one other substantive interim report on March 17, 1969, recommending a standard immunity provision to replace the scores of divergent immunity provisions
in existing law. The recommendation favored "use immunity" rather than "transactional
immunity." The proposal was enacted in Title II of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1970). Although this looks like an excursion beyond the Commission's
chosen field of substantive reform to a controversial procedural issue, the fact that "transactional immunity" is a defense rather than a rule of evidence brought the issue plausibly within
the Commission's self-imposed subject-matter limitation. The position taken clearly constituted
a bid by the Commission for the confidence of the "law-and-order" elements among its own
members and in Congress.
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The strategic importance of publishing an interim draft was considerable. In the first place, it compelled us to produce a complete draft well in
advance of our deadline. That seemed the best way to avoid bogging down
on those issues with which we happened to start our work. The experience
of the drafters of the Model Penal Code had shown that in a large project
time tends to be allocated not according to the importance of particular
topics but according to the order in which topics are taken up. The first
topics, however unimportant, swallow up massive fractions of time and
energy simply because the participants have the impression that a great deal
of time remains. Toward the end of the project, enormously difficult and
important issues get summary disposition in the face of tomorrow's printing
deadline. Having a complete draft long before that deadline provides an
interval during which attention can be given to reworking the most crucial
provisions.
A second reason for early formulation of a complete draft is that solid
decisions cannot be made while drafting one provision of a code without
knowing how other provisions are going to be handled. What is the general
scheme of prison terms within which theft penalties are to be fitted? Is there
to be a general section on "solicitation," or must each substantive section
deal independently with solicitation to commit the specific offense? If the
section dealing with attempt provides for penalties at a lower level than for
completed offenses, shall this policy be rejected or qualified in particular
applications, such as theft or burglary, where the definition of the crime
embraces much behavior that, analytically, amounts to attempt?
Another strategic consideration in favor of preparing a complete tentative draft is that the staff enjoys more freedom and can proceed more rapidly
than would be possible if the Commission had to be fully persuaded at every
stage of progress. The Commission was composed of very busy people.
Meetings could not be scheduled more frequently than once in two months,
and some members could not attend regularly or throughout the day or days
of a scheduled meeting. There was a natural tendency to defer serious
consideration until the last moment when final decisions had to be made. A
study draft in which no decision purports to be final is well adapted to such a
situation. Commission members could take a more relaxed attitude toward
proposals they might later come to view with alarm. Not only would the
staff be allowed more leeway in a study draft, but a draft in being would
enjoy a certain tactical advantage in subsequent Commission debates.
Not surprisingly, the Study Draft was somewhat more radical than the
Final Draft. The members of the Commission who were well aware of the
strategy of the situation (a) reviewed the Study Draft provisions scrupulously; (b) changed its proposed title from "Tentative Draft" (which was
functionally accurate) to the more noncommittal "Study Draft"; (c) overrode the Director on some points and required inclusion in the Study Draft of

180
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alternative positions espoused by minority members;2 9 and (d) insisted on a
declaration in boldfaced type on the cover that "The Study Draft provisions
are not to be taken as representing the position of the Commission on any
particular issue." Significantly, as the printing deadline for the Final Report
approached, some members of the Commission, notably Senators McClellan and Hruska, became increasingly reluctant to be bound even by the
Commission's tentative decisions. At the same time, however, they desired
to strengthen the impetus toward revision of the federal penal code by
having the Commission submit a "unanimous" report. The result was
"6unanimous" support of the Final Draft "as a work basis upon which the
Congress may undertake the necessary reform. . . .Individually we have
reservations, sometimes strong, on the resolution of particular issues." 30
Like the Study Draft, the Final Report articulated alternatives favored by
minority members (usually conservative). Not surprisingly, these minority
positions came to supersede the Commission's majority views when the
Senate Subcommittee revised the Commission's Code for incorporation in
S. 1.
The Commission's Final Report was delivered on February 10, 1971,
in a formal ceremony in the Hearing Room of the Senate Judiciary Committee amid a chorus of approbation and mutual congratulations. 3 Attorney
General John Mitchell accepted it for President Nixon, going so far as to
dismiss as "nonsense" a criticism already heard in some quarters that the
jurisdictional provisions of the Commission's Code were too comprehensive, overrode states' rights, and portended the creation of a vast "federal
police.''32 The Attorney General's epithet was entirely appropriate, but it
29.

See, e.g., STUDY DRAFT, ch. 36 (capital punishment); id. §§ 1005,3203 (special sentenc-

ing for organized crime); id. § 3204 (sentences up to one year for misdemeanors, where the
Director favored from one to three months); id. § 405(1)(b) (proposal for class actions to
reimburse victims of corporate crime, deleted in final code). For a full list of changes between
the Study Draft and the Final Report, see COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 343.
30. Letter from Edmund G. Brown to the President and Congress (Jan. 7, 1971), reprinted
in COMMISSION FINAL REPORT i.

31.
32.

See SUBCOMMITrEE HEARINGS, Part I, at 1-128 (1971).
See Liebmann, Chartering a National Police Force, 56 A.B.A.J. 1070, 1071 (1970),
reprintedin SUBcOMMiTTEE HEARINGS, Part I, at 64, 65 (1971):
From these modest beginnings there has sprung forth a monster. The proposed
study draft works not a revision and rearrangement of the federal criminal code...
but rather a wholesale expansion of federal police power and a wholesale destruction
of state responsibility and state autonomy in the preservation of public order and the
administration of criminal law.
See also Resolution of the National Association of Attorneys General, in SUBCOMMITrEE
HEARINGS, Part I, at 6, 9 (1971). These critics were primarily concerned by § 201(b) of the
Commission Code, the so-called "piggyback" provision-which allows federal prosecution

of all crimes involved in a single episode if federal jurisdiction exists for any of the crimes.
The response to this criticism is twofold: First, the section is simply one element in a

catalogue of available jurisdictional bases and is inoperative except as explicitly adopted in a
substantive section of the code; second, the provision does not expand current federal
jurisdiction. Existing federal law follows the "piggyback" principle quite haphazardly, as in

Vol. 1977:171]

FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW REFORM

was prudently excised from the stenographic transcript of the proceedings.
That was the first small retreat from the Brown Commission.
Under President Nixon's instructions, the Department of Justice began
the study and revision of the Commission Code 33 which would lead to the
administration bill, S. 1400, in the Ninety-third Congress. Senator McClellan, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, instituted the monumental consideration of the
Commission Code that eventuated in S. 1. The priority which Senator
McClellan was prepared to assign to revision of the penal code is suggested
by the bill number which he secured for it; it may be recalled that S. 2 in the
Ninety-third Congress dealt with no trivial matter-liquidation of the Vietnam War. 34 The clever, scholarly and indefatigable Professor G. Robert
Blakey, who had been in effect counsel to the conservatives on the Brown
Commission, was put in charge of the staff of the Subcommittee project.
The Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, although dominated by liberals, including Representatives Kastenmeier
and Edwards who had served on the Brown Commission, was not prepared
to move so fast. The Commission Code was duly embodied in a bill, H.R.
330, but no hearings were scheduled. The reasons for this were mixed and
obscure. Some had to do with conflicts of priorities in the House Judiciary
Committee. 35 There was also a feeling in some quarters that the conservative
thrust of the Senate could be most effectively countered by waiting out the
battle there between conservatives and liberals, after which the Senate's
version could be bottled up or cut up in the House. Some felt that postponing
action until a Democratic President and a new Congress convened in 1977
would assure a better product as well as credit to the Democrats. House
liberals were content for the moment, therefore, to go along with the
movement to defeat S. 1 by sponsoring the belated and hastily drafted
alternative bills H.R. 10850 and H.R. 12504.36 The pressure of these bills
provisions for life imprisonment where "death results" in connection with malicious mischief
to interstate vehicles, 18 U.S.C. § 34 (1970), or civil rights offenses, id. § 245(b)(5), and

provisions for the imposition of the death penalty where a killing occurs in connection with a
bank robbery, id. § 2113(e).
33. Representatives of the Department had, of course, followed the Commission's

deliberations closely, attending meetings as observers and commenting informally on staff
drafts. Ronald F. Gainer, Director of the Justice Department's Office of Policy and Planning

and an able, experienced and perceptive public servant, was the Department's principal
liaison officer with the Commission and was subsequently put in charge of the Department's

work on the penal reform legislation.
34. S. 2, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (a bill "to Provide for the Cessation of Bombing in
Indochina and for the Withdrawal of U.S. Military Personnel from the Republic of Viet
Nam, Cambodia and Laos").
35. Among other extensive and controversial projects occupying the Committee during

the relevant period were revision of the copyright law, review of the proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, and impeachment of President Nixon.

36. See notes 245-63 infra and accompanying text.
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helped to discourage a crucial and surprisingly liberal compromise that
seemed about to emerge in the Senate in the spring of 1976.
B.

Basic Policy: Deterrence;Role of Retribution

The Commission embarked on the reform project with the generally
shared hypothesis that, whatever the ultimate causes of crime may be, a
counter-incentive should be provided by a system of threats of punishment.
Deterrence or, more broadly, prevention, is thus the basic policy that
underlies the Code, although the Code's statement of purposes, which is
intended to guide interpretation and administration of the statute, includes
37
not only rehabilitation but also retribution.
The draftsmen did not, of course, entertain the naive notion that all
crimes are deterrable. There are crimes of passion and patriotism that seem
virtually undeterrable. There are also people who commit offenses precisely
because of a desire to suffer consequences or to savor extreme risks. Perhaps
we should not even regard such desires as pathological, in that "sane" men
climb Mt. Everest, but merely register the observation that the number of
risk-seeking offenders is so small as not to count in any formulation of
general penal policy. It is worth remembering that even in insane asylums
(read "hospitals" if so inclined) dealing with minimally deterrable people,
rules and sanctions are used to promote essential decency and order.
It is widely believed that most human activity-indeed, most animal
activity-is governed by a pleasure-pain calculus. On that hypothesis society bases not only its deterrent penal codes, but also its entire system of
affirmative awards: profits for entrepreneurs, salary increases for bureaucrats, Nobel Prizes for scientists and artists, patents for inventors, tax incentives for investment in petroleum exploration, prizes and scholarships for
academic achievers, and so on. To believe that these contingent rewards do
not influence attitudes and behavior is to reject the deterrent hypothesis in
38
criminal law.
In the Commission Code, if not in S. 1, retribution serves its classic
and least objectionable function of setting limits on the state's power to
punish. It is this notion that underlies, for example, the declared policies in
favor of requiring proof of "culpability" 39 and in favor of the defense of
37. "[Ihe provisions of this Code are intended. . . to achieve the following objectives:
(a) to insure the public safety through (i) vindication of public norms by the imposition of
merited punishment; (ii) the deterrent influence of the penalties . . . provided;
(iii) the rehabilitation of those convicted . . . ." COMMISSION CODE § 102. S. I recited
approximately the same range of goals, but manifested a priority for retribution by prescribing
"sanctions . . .that will assure just punishment." S. I § 101(b) (emphasis added). See
also the critical departures of S. 1 from the Commission Code in regard to standards for
probation and parole, discussed at text accompanying notes 177-85 & 191-93 infra.
38. See J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974); F. ZIMRING & J. HAWKINS,
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).

39. The Commission Code provides that guilt without culpability shall exist only where
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insanity. n0 It is often forgotten that the saying "an eye for an eye; a tooth for
a tooth" was in its time a policy of moderation, for the alternative was likely
to be capital punishment for mere wounding or theft. Equally true in our
day, when many people insist on extreme penalties as essential to security or
mandated by Holy Writ, the common man's sense of "proportionality"
(i.e. retribution) serves to minimize the scope of application of those
penalties, for example, by excluding capital punishment for attempted
murder 41 and for non-homicidal offenses. 42
In any event, retribution as a goal of the criminal law could not, as a
practical matter, be excluded from a democratically enacted code in this
country, where massive popular support for retribution has recently been
demonstrated by the surge of capital punishment legislation following the
Supreme Court's invalidation of older arbitrary procedures for imposing it.43
Justice Stewart's opinion in Gregg v. Georgia,44 sustaining Georgia's
revised capital punishment procedures, restores to retribution a legitimacy
which it had begun to lose, at least in some professional circles:
In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral
outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its
citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their
wrongs. "The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves
an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed
by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
'deserve,' then are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante
justice, and lynch law. . . " "Retribution is no longer the dominant
objective of the criminal law," . . . but neither is it a forbidden
objective nor one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of
the statute expressly so permits, COMMISSION CODE § 302(2), and that criminal negligence, as
distinguished from civil negligence, requires proof of a "gross deviation from acceptable
standards of conduct." Id. § 302(1)(d). S. 1 substitutes the non-committal phrase "state of
mind" for "culpability," S. I § 301, and does not insist on an explicit statutory basis for
strict liability for the numerous regulatory offenses outside the criminal code. Id. §
303(a)(1)(B).
40. COMMISSION CODE § 503. S. I permits only limited use of the insanity defense. S. I §
522. See Part IV. B. infra.
41. For a sophisticated analysis that would, on deterrent grounds, equate the penalties

for murder and attempted murder, see Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of
Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974).
42. Most states do not penalize rape or armed robbery by capital punishment, and it has
now been questioned whether statutes that do provide such penalties are invalid under the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 n.35 (1976)
(reserving judgment as to whether capital punishment is unconstitutionally "disproportionate"
to such offenses).
43. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The ensuing legislative response is summarized in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 178-83 (1976).
44.

428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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men ....
Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may be the
appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to
humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of
death. 45
In vain did Justice Marshall, dissenting with Justice Brennan, point out
that life imprisonment might well be regarded, in the United States as in
most advanced Western civilizations, as adequate "expression of [society's]
moral outrage.'"46 The frightening implications of the proposition that society may be as cruel to the despised criminal as he "deserves" are only
partially mitigated by Justice Stewart's concurrent declaration that punishment must not be "excessive" or inconsistent with "the dignity of man,"
the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment." 47 We shall see that
a fundamental cleavage between S. 1 and the Commission Code concerns
the emphasis to be given to retribution.
Rehabilitation is a declared goal of S. 1, as well as the Commission
Code, notwithstanding growing skepticism as to the feasibility of reconstructing character in a penal setting. 48 At the least, efforts should be made,
during a period of incarceration mandated for other purposes, to educate,
motivate and resocialize the offender. The goal of rehabilitation also mandates concern that the circumstances of detention and the length of imprisonment not be destructive of the personality of prisoners.
I.

SOME COMMON GROUND: CONSENSUS REFORMS

My detailed criticisms of S. 1 and S. 1400 have been published
elsewhere. 49 What may usefully be done here, before going on to identify
crucial issues that remain to be resolved, is to outline the progressive
elements which S. 1 adopted from the Commission Code, or even added to
it, and with respect to which a substantial consensus already exists.
A.

Basic Structure of the Code; FederalJurisdiction

All agree that the United States, which has never before had a comprehensive, logically organized and internally consistent penal code, shall
45. Id. at 183-84 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972); Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)) (footnotes omitted).
46. 428 U.S. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
48. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 86-102 (1973); Allen,
Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 226
(1959).

49. See Schwartz, supra note 4; Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code, The
Administration'sBill, S. 1400, 13 CRiM. L. REP. (BNA) 3265 (1973), reprintedin SUBCOMMIT EE

HEARrNGs, Part X, at 6980 (1974). See also Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Criminal
Code, Comparison of S. I and the Recommendations of the National Commission on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws, in SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part V, at 5380 (1973).
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now have one. In place of the present Title 18 of the United States Code,
which is merely an assembly of ancient and new provisions arranged
alphabetically with little regard to the content of successive chapters, the
new code will have three main divisions. These will deal, respectively, with
general matters,5 0 specific offenses5 l and the sentencing system.5 2 The
General Part will cover federal jurisdiction (that is, the scope of application
of the federal code);53 definitions (never before undertaken by Congress) of
"intention," 5 4 "recklessness," 5 5 "negligence, ' 5 6 exculpating "mistake," 57 "insanity ' 58 and other elements of mens rea;59 the liability of
accomplices 60 and corporations;61 the statute of limitations;62 and other
similar matters.
The very important problems of justification and excuse would also be
dealt with in the General Part. 63 These defenses to prosecution have heretofore been totally disregarded by Congress, so that the courts have had to
develop the law on a case-by-case basis, predictably producing inconsistencies and ambiguities. 64 Since the operational effect of a penal provision
results from a combination of prohibition and exceptions or defenses, it is
strange and potentially unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness to have
criminal laws say, in effect, "Thou shalt not do X. . .except as the courts
qualify this prohibition by recognizing justifications and excuses." On the
other hand, the issues of justification and excuse are perplexing, and penal
theory in this area is primitive. We shall see below that, while there is
agreement that the Code should address itself to defining the defenses, very
sharp controversy remains as to how far to go along that road.65
The problems of federal penal jurisdiction may be analyzed under four
main headings: (1) the core of the federal government's power to preserve
itself and carry out federal functions (herein of treason, espionage, tax and
50.
51.

See COMMISSION CODE §§ 101-709; S. 1 §§ 101-552.
See COMMISSION CODE §§ 1001-1861; S. I §§ 1001-1863; Brown and Schwartz,

Offenses Redefined UnderProposed Federal Criminal Code, supra note 26, at 78.
52.

See COMMISSION CODE §§ 3001-3604; S. 1 §§ 2001-2403.

53. See COMMISSION CODE §§ 201-219; S. I §§ 201-205.
54. COMMISSION CODE § 302(1)(a); S. I § 302(a).
55. COMMISSION CODE § 302(1)(c); S. I § 302(c).
56. COMMISSION CODE § 302(1)(d); S. 1 § 302(d).
57. COMMISSION CODE § 609; S. I § 521.
58. COMMISSION CODE § 503; S. 1 § 522.
59. See generally COMMISSION CODE §§ 301-305; S. 1 §§ 301-303.
60. COMMISSION CODE § 401; S. 1 § 401.
61. COMMISSION CODE §§ 402-403; S. 1 § 402.
62. COMMISSION CODE § 701; S. 1 § 511.
63. COMMISSION CODE §§ 601-610, 619; S. 1 §§ 521-523, 531, 541-544, 551-552.
64. One such example is the insanity defense. At present, at least five different
formulas are being utilized in the federal courts. See 1 COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS 229-47.
65. See notes 150-54, 212-14, 230-46 infra and accompanying text.
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customs violations, etc.); (2) the territorial scope within which federal
legislative power is plenary (federal enclaves, American vessels on the high
seas) and where the federal penal code would be, in principle, as comprehensive as that of an ordinary state; (3) the question of "assimilated
crimes'"-state-defined offenses which Congress adopts by reference for
application in federal enclaves; 66 and (4) the question of the extent to which
Congress should, by using its constitutional power (for example, over
interstate commerce or the mails), make federal crimes out of behavior that
is already penalized by state law.
Only this last category of federal jurisdiction calls for discussion here. I
have described and sought to rationalize this federal auxiliary criminal
jurisdiction elsewhere. 67 It came into existence in the nineteenth century to
deal with multi-state crime, notably large-scale frauds. Initially, the thought
was simply to deny the use of federal facilities, for example, the mails or
facilities of interstate communications or commerce, to those who would
employ them for nefarious purposes. 6 "Use of the mails" to carry out the
scheme was conceived of as the "gist" of the "mail fraud" offense, 69 and
every separate use of the mails was a distinct offense for purposes of
prosecution and punishment. 70 The fraudulent operation itself remained
71
theoretically the responsibility of the states.
This theoretical nicety had unfortunate practical consequences which
will be eliminated by common consent in the new federal penal code. First,
the United States found it difficult to extradite fugitive swindlers because
extradition treaties generally required that the behavior be penalized in both
the demanding and the extraditing state, and foreign countries knew no such
offense as "mail fraud." Second, since each posting was a separate offense,
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970); COMMISSION CODE § 209; S. 1 § 1863. See also I
COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS 33, 77-103. Any federal code must incorporate by reference

masses of minor local traffic and other regulations, on which Congress should not waste its
time and which in any event ought ordinarily to conform with the regulations of neighboring
non-enclave communities.
67. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 64 (1948).

68. See id. at 74-75.
69. See, e.g., Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 315 (1896): "It is enough if,
having devised a scheme to defraud, the defendant with a view of executing it deposits in the
post office letters, which he thinks may assist in carrying it into effect, although in the
judgment of the jury they may be absolutely ineffective therefor." See also Schwartz,
supra note 67, at 79: "Courts find themselves talking nonsense like the oft-repeated
declaration that the use of the mails is the 'gist' of the offense of mail fraud, when all that is
meant is that this federal jurisdictional element must, of course, be alleged and proved"
(footnote omitted).
70.

See note 74 infra.

71. See Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1960) (a scheme to defraud by
misappropriating school district's moneys and property constitutes essentially a state crime
and can be federal only if mails are used for the purpose of executing such a scheme).
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federal prosecutors could secure multiple indictments for a single fraud.72
The situation was aggravated as the mail fraud statute was amended to
permit prosecution not only for posting but also for causing nefarious mail
to be delivered.73 Since substantial frauds might involve thousands of
mailings, the number of offenses charged and therefore the limits of punishment became virtually a matter of prosecutorial discretion. Third, when
there was a conviction on several counts, some federal judges carried the
logic of "mailings-as-the-gist-of-the-offense" to its ridiculous conclusion:
not satisfied with the statutory maximum of five years which Congress had
prescribed for mail fraud, they would impose consecutive five-year sentences for separate mailings. 74 The situation was aggravated by the enactment at different times of federal statutes using different constitutional bases
to penalize fraud, extortion, or dissemination of obscenity.75 Thus, different
federal offenses, sometimes differently penalized, might be committed
depending on whether the accused employed the mail or the interstate
telephone, or on whether the contraband was imported from abroad or
transported in interstate commerce. Moreover, under the doctrine that state
and federal governments might both prosecute and punish identical misbehavior offending their separate "sovereignties," the accused were exposed
to official abuse of power that violated the spirit if not the letter of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 76 Finally, the inevitable
differences between the federal definition of a particular category of offense
and the cognate offense under state law produced anomalies. For example,
unlike the false pretenses statutes of most states, the federal mail fraud law
could be used to punish misrepresentations of opinion, value, intention or
law. 77 The result is that in a strictly local swindle, criminal liability may
depend on whether prosecution is undertaken by federal authorities or local
prosecutors.
As federal penal legislation has proliferated in the twentieth century, it
has become evident that the role of the federal government can no longer be
72. Judicial revulsion against such scholastic excesses may be seen in Bell v. United
States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) (transport of several women in interstate commerce on a single
occasion is a single offense). But cf. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (multiple,
different charges based on a single narcotics transaction).
73. 25 Stat. 873 (1889) (amending 70 Rev. Stat. § 5480 (1878)).
74. See, e.g., Becker v. United States, 91 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1937) (two five-year sentences
to be served consecutively for two letters to the same victim); Beckett v. United States, 84 F.2d

731 (6th Cir. 1936) (cumulating sentences permitted but caution and moderation should rule its
exercise); cf. Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1969) (defendant could have
received maximum consecutive sentences totaling 115 years under multiple count fraud indictment).
75. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1027 (1970) (fraud and false statements); id. §§ 872,

875-877, 1951 (extortion); id. §§ 1461-1464 (obscenity).
76. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (earlier state court conviction does

not bar federal prosecution under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment).
77. See United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1932).
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regarded as merely protecting federal facilities from wrongdoers. In reality
we have two largely overlapping systems of criminal justice. Occasionally,
all pretense of a confined role for the federal government has been abandoned where plenary federal jurisdiction (not, however, preclusive of parallel state enforcement) 78 is claimed by Congress on the basis of its findings
that local, interstate and international operations are inextricably intertwined.7 9
The changed role of federal penal law is reflected in both the Commis-

sion Code and S. 1. The definitions of offenses are in terms of conduct and
culpability just as in state and foreign national codes. The question of the
circumstances under which the federal government may and should intervene is dealt with separately, 0 making it impossible any longer to regard the
78. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 896 (1970) (Organized Crime Control Act):
This chapter [extortionate credit transactions] does not preempt any field of law
with respect to which State legislation would be permissible in the absence of this
chapter. No law of any State which would be valid in the absence of this chapter may
be held invalid or inapplicable by virtue of the existence of this chapter, and no
officer, agency, or instrumentality of any State may be deprived by virtue of this
chapter of any jurisdiction over any offense over which it would have jurisdiction in
the absence of this chapter.
79. See, e.g., Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.
§ 801 (1970). A similar plenary federal jurisdiction has been asserted in the drive against
organized crime. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894, 896 (1970) (loansharking); cf. Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 14 (1971) (sustaining constitutionality of the loansharking jurisdiction). The
Brown Commission accepted the recently enacted plenary jurisdiction approach to the loansharking offense. See COMMISSION CODE § 1771, Comment, at 238 (timidly proferring the
suggestion that such "jurisdiction may be overbroad").
A like treatment was proposed in S. I for the quite comprehensively defined "racketeering" crimes (§§ 1801-1804, 1806). In discussing the scope of these crimes, the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee Report stated:
This slightly expands burrent law, which requires that the enterprise be engaged in or
affect interstate or foreign commerce. As a practical matter, virtually every enterprise's activities under this section would meet the "affect" criterion. However, the
Committee believes that it should not be necessary to show a nexus with interstate
commerce in view of the findings and purpose expressed by Congress in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, to the effect that the activities of organized crime
in the aggregate have a substantial adverse impact upon a variety of Federal interests,
including but not limited to interstate and foreign commerce.
3 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 773. Similarly, S. I utilized the plenary jurisdiction approach for
various drug offenses. See S. I §§ 1811 (trafficking in an opiate), 1812 (trafficking in drugs),
1813 (possessing drugs) and 1814 (violating a drug regulation).
80. In the Commission Code, the twelve "common jurisdictional bases" are catalogued in
section 201. Thereafter, a simple cross-reference in each substantive offense section serves to
designate the particular basis Congress wishes to invoke for that offense. This greatly simplifies
and shortens the substantive offense sections. The arrangement was, however, misconstrued
by inattentive readers, who supposed that section 201 was a consolidation of all possible
jurisdictional bases to be available for federal prosecution of any offense. Others may well
have been shocked simply to discover the breadth of federal potential, and were disinclined to
give a prominence to the phenomenon or to provide Congress with an easy format for enlarging
the federal role if it so desired.
These anti-federalist fears were sought to be assuaged in S. I by dismantling the catalogue.
This required spelling out in each substantive section the various federal bases applicable to
that section. Although the operative effect is quite close to the Commission's jurisdictional

Vol. 1977:171]

FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW REFORM

jurisdictional base as the gist of an offense. S. 1 followed the Commission
Code in declaring that "culpability is not required with respect to any fact
which is solely a basis for federal jurisdiction." 81 That is, a defendant's
guilt of a substantive federal offense does not require proof that he knew he
was on federal territory or that he was "affecting" interstate commerce.
Artificial multiplication of charges is eliminated by declaring that "[t]he
existence of multiple jurisdictional bases for an offense does not increase the
number of offenses committed. '82
Despite a huge pseudo-controversy, another area of general substantive
agreement was the so-called "piggyback jurisdiction." The issue relates to
violations of federal laws, for example, civil rights, safety of interstate
transportation, or robbery of national banks, where the core transgression
against federal interests is accompanied by death or other personal aggression cognizable under state law. While such killings, kidnappings and
similar offenses might have been left to separate prosecution by the state,
the practical answer was to have every aspect of the controversy disposed of
in a single federal prosecution. That answer is incorporated in present
federal law, albeit awkwardly, by prescribing specially severe sentences for
certain violations if a killing occurs. 3 All pending proposals adopt this
84
approach with insubstantial variations.
arrangements, the drafting becomes unhappily turgid. See, e.g., S. I § 1731(c) (thirty jurisdic-

tional bases for theft).
Paradoxically, the one section of the Commission Code that would have strongly reaffirmed state responsibility for local offenses disappeared in S. 1. Commission Code section 207

called upon federal law enforcement agencies to abstain from exercising a technically available
jurisdictional power where the offense had no substantial out-of-state or federal dimension.

Rather than retaining this provision the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee adopted a different
approach:

[S. 1] provides for submission by the Attorney General of annual reports to Congress,
setting forth for each offense the number of prosecutions commenced during the
preceding year, and identifying the number prosecuted under each particular circum-

stance giving rise to Federal jurisdiction. This is designed to provide the Congress
with information that will flag any material increase or decrease in Federal prosecution in particular areas, thereby permhting inquiry to be made into the reasons for
such increase or decrease and prompting periodic evaluation of the proper scope of

Federal jurisdiction in such areas.
2 SUBCOMMrrrEE REPORT 33. Growing familiarity of the legal profession with the true import of

the Commission's jurisdictional arrangement may permit a return to the simpler formulation in
subsequent bills and a revival of Commission Code section 207.

81.

COMMISSION CODE §§ 204, 302(3)(C); S.1 § 303(d)(2).

82. COMMISSION CODE § 205; cf. S.I § 201(b)(1).
83. See note 32 supra.

84. The discussions concerning "piggyback" jurisdiction were briefly summarized in the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Report:
[T]he concept has the advantages of permitting a unitary adjudication and punishment of a defendant's entire course of criminal behavior, when a series of offenses is

committed in the course of a Federal crime. However, indiscriminate application of
this jurisdictional notion could also drastically impinge upon the traditional prerogatives of the States by permitting Federal prosecution for offenses where there exists
only a tenuous Federal nexus at best.
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Modernized Definition of Offenses

A second major front on which S. 1marches forward in the track of the
Commission 'Code, although with some stumbling, is bringing the definition
and grading of offenses into accord with twentieth-century conditions and
values. A notably new comprehensive "theft" section will replace the crazy
patchwork of existing sections dealing with many versions of larceny,

85
embezzlement, fraudulent conversion and obtaining by false pretenses.

The opportunities for crooks to slip through the technical holes in the present
net will be narrowed. Penalties will be graduated according to the scale of
the thievery. s6 The same grading principle will govern the penalization of
tax fraud.8 7 High corporate officials will be responsible for corporate crimes
if they contribute to the offense by willful or reckless default in a duty to
supervise corporate behavior. 88 Fine levels will be systematically graded,

and, for offenses involving pecuniary gain, may go as high as twice the
amount of the gain or twice the loss caused to the victim.8 9 Making use of

the sensitivity of major corporations to adverse public and political reactions, corporate misbehavior will be discouraged by requiring the organization to publicize convictions. 9° Convicted corporate officers may be dis-

qualified from exercising management functions similar to those they had
abused. 91 These advances in control of white-collat and high corporate
crime are alone enough to expose the absurdity of charges from the Left that
2 SuBcoMMITrEE REPORT 30. See also id. 29-32; Note, Piggyback Jurisdiction in the Proposed
Federal Criminal Code, 81 YALE L.J. 1209 (1972).
85. See COMMISSION CODE §§ 1731-1735, 1741; S. I §§ 1731-1738. See also COMMIssION
FINAL REPORT 205 (introductory note on theft and related offenses); 3 SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT
649-703.
86. COMMISSION CODE § 1735; S. 1 § 1731(b).
87. COMMISSION CODE § 1401(2); S. 1 § 1401(b).
88. COMMISSION CODE § 403(4); S. I § 403(c).
89. COMMISSION CODE § 3301; S. 1 § 2201.
90. COMMISSION CODE § 3007; S. 1 § 2004. Under these sections the corporation or
organization that has been found guilty of an offense may be ordered by the court to give notice
of the conviction to the class of persons or to the sector of the public affected by the conviction
or financially interested in the subject matter of the offense by mail, by advertising in designated areas or through designated media or by other appropriate means. It is interesting to note
that while conservative members of the Commission favored a narrower publicity sanction,
compare COMMISSION CODE § 3007 with STUDY DRAFr § 405(1)(a), S. I adopted the broader
version. The use of unfavorable publicity as a sanction against corporate depredations is an idea
whose time has come. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of Jan. 4, 1975 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b(b) (Supp. 1976)) (public notification respecting rule violation or unfair
or deceptive act or practice). See generally COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS 166, 191-93.
91. COMMISSION CODE § 3502; S.I § 1-4A3(b), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (McClellan
draft), reprintedin SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, Part V, at 4248 (1973). In S. I §§ 2103(b)(6) and
3834(c), this disqualification of corporate officers appears in modified form as a permissible
condition of probation or parole, respectively.
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S. 1 was a fascist conspiracy between the
"Nixon men" and Senator
92
people.
American
the
enslave
to
McClellan
Interestingly, S. 1 actually made some advances over the Brown
Commission in the civil rights area, where the Commission was cautiously
content to codify existing law. The civil rights offenses are broadened to
protect aliens as well as citizens.93 Infringement of civil rights is made an
offense when perpetrated by an individual, and not merely, as at present,
when perpetrated by several persons in conspiracy. 94 Provisions against
sexual discrimination have been added to the civil rights sections. 95 The
offenses of rape and cognate aggressive homosexuality have been consolidated so as to eliminate pejorative references to "deviate" sexual inter96
course.
Among other modernizations in the definition and grading of offenses
that can be characterized as noncontroversial in view of the substantial
concurrence of S. 1 with the Commission Code are the following. The
distinctions between first and second degree murder, based on "deliberation" and "premeditation," which centuries of experience have shown to
operate haphazardly and even perversely, will disappear, 97 as will arbitrary
limits on the types of provocation that suffice to reduce a homicide to the
level of manslaughter. 98 The new federal code will be shorn of antiquated
and unenforceable morals legislation like the provision penalizing seduction
of female passengers on steamboats, regardless of age or consent, by
"solicitation or the making of gifts or presents." 99 In place of the present
federal rape statute,1 "° which authorizes life imprisonment or death without
discriminating between forcible ravishment by a stranger and intercourse
between "dating" couples who may have been engaging in sexual intimacies just short of intercourse, the new federal code will reserve extreme
penalties for the former situation. 101 It will also treat violent imposition of
92. See text accompanying notes 225-28 infra.
93. Compare S. I § 1501 with COMMISSION CODE § 1501 ("person" substituted for "citizen," which the Brown Commission accepted from existing law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,242 (1970)).
See also 2 SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT 465-70.
94. 2 SUBCOMMITEE REPORT 465-70.
95.

S. I § 1504; see 2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 482.

§§ 1641 (rape), 1642 (sexual assault) and 1646 (general provisions) with
Compare
COMMISSION CODE §§ 1641 (rape), 1643 (aggravated involuntary sodomy), 1642 (gross sexual
imposition) and 1644 (involuntary sodomy).
§
I§
COMMISSION
I §§
§
cf.
§
§
§ 1641 (rape is Class Felony
§ 1641 (two classes of rape); cf.
COMMISSION
punishable
up to fifteen years imprisonment; however, defendant will face additional
§
liability for battery, kidnapping or other code offenses). See also MODEL
2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT
(Proposed Official Draft,
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homosexual relations in a manner parallel to the rape of a female by a
male.' 0 2 The federal government will withdraw from its Victorian pretension to police the private sexual behavior of adults; the purview of the Mann
04
Act' 0 3 will be limited to substantial commercial operations.1
C.

Sentencing

Sentencing is a third major reform front on which S. 1 advanced in the
direction marked out by the Brown Commission. It did not advance far
enough. It was primarily marred by retention of a retributive emphasis found
in existing law. Thus, sentencing remains a central controversy between
proponents and opponents of S. 1, as will be shown below. 10 5 Nevertheless,
it is important to recognize the areas of agreement. To the extent that such
consensus has been achieved, a new domain of civil liberties has been
staked out. The most important sectors of this new domain are:
1. Grading. Each serious offense will be divided into several degrees, reserving the most severe penalties for aggravated forms of the
offense.
2. Specially dangerous offenders. The maximum sentence for each
grade will be available only if the defendant is a dangerous recidivist, a
professional criminal or a mental deviate, or if he employs firearms or
06
bombs in carrying out the offense.
3. Consecutive or cumulated sentences. Harsh and arbitrary cumulation of sentences will be minimized not only in the case of multiple mail
fraud charges,10 7 but also where multiple distinct offenses are involved. 08
In principle, repetition of offenses is to be treated as an aggravating factor
within the statutory maximum for the grade, as provided in paragraph 2
above. No longer will a burglar who is implicated in five or ten burglaries be
theoretically subject to five or ten times the fifteen-year maximum for
burglary. 109 Instead, based on the severe nature and circumstances of the
offense and the character of the defendant, he becomes one of the minority
102. COMMISSION CODE §§ 1643, 1644; S. 1 § 1645 (unlawful sexual contact is an offense two
grades below that of the corresponding offense under the rape sections).
103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1970).

104. COMMISSION CODE § 1841 (promoting prostitution); S. I § 1843 (conducting a prostitution business).
105. See Part IV. C. infra.
106. Compare COMMISSION CODE § 3202 with S. I § 3202(b).
107. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.

108. If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time or if a
term is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms will run concurrently unless the court orders that they be served consecutively.
Compare COMMISSION CODE § 3204 with S. I § 2304.

109. See 18 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970).
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of burglars who can be given a sentence as high asfifteen years. 1° This but
reflects the obvious truth that legislatures set fifteen-year maxima precisely
for the worst offenders.
The existing rule permitting cumulation of sentences has a number of
baneful effects. It permits gross inequalities in sentencing, since some
judges abuse the discretion to cumulate while most follow the practice of
making multiple sentences concurrent. Unlimited cumulative sentencing is
also employed by a minority of judges to frustrate the legislative will with
regard to parole. A judge who is unsympathetic to parole generally or in a
particular case can give a sentence so long that the convict will not become
eligible for parole until he has fully served the maximum jail sentence that
was appropriate for the offense. The judge thus succeeds in equating the
minimum with the maximum, imposing, in effect, a flat sentence, whereas
Congress has declared that the minimum for parole eligibility shall not
exceed one third of the maximum."
4. Penal policy; legislative criteria for sentencing; review of sentence. For the first time in the history of the country federal law will declare
the purposes of the penal system,11 2 provide guidelines for the exercise of
sentencing discretion, 11 3 and direct the appellate courts to review at least the
longer sentences as a check against abuse of discretion by sentencing
judges. 1 14 In each case there are shortcomings in the S. 1 provisions, but that
should not obscure the central fact that progress beyond existing law was
embodied in the bill.
5. Parole. The new federal code will by common consent eliminate
the absurdity of present law which in effect prescribes the shortestperiod of
parole supervision for the most dangerous convicts. This paradox results
from the traditional view that parole is simply an act of mercy that permits
service of part of the sentence outside the prison walls.1 15 A parole board is
110. Under COMMISSION CODE § 1711(2), burglary is a Class B Felony, the maximum term
for which is fifteen years. Id. § 3201(1)(b). Under S. I § 1711(b) burglary is a Class C Felony
punishable by up to fifteen years imprisonment, id. § 2301(b)(3), unless the offender is deemed

dangerous, in which case the maximum term is increased to twenty-five years. Id. § 2301(c).
111. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4202, 4208 (1970).
112. See COMMISSION CODE § 102 (derived from ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1-2 (Smith-Hurd
1972); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 21 (McKinney 1970)); S. 1 § 101.
113. See COMMISSION CODE § 3101; S. 1 § 2102(a). See also COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS
1267-69, 1300, 1306-07.
114. Compare COMMISSION CODE Comment, at 317 (proposed revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1291
for appellate review of sentences) with S. 1 §§ 3721-3726. As for requiring judges to provide
written justifications for sentencing actions, see COMMISSION CODE §§ 3201(3) (fixing a

minimum term), 3202(4) (imposing specially long terms for dangerous offenders) and 3204(5)
(exercising the limited discretion to make sentences consecutive). S. I does not require these

written justifications.
115.

Under current law a term of parole extends from release until the expiration of the

maximum term specified in the original sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1970). Contra, 21 U.S.C.
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likely to keep the most dangerous prisoners inside the walls until they have
fully served their sentence. In that event, no part of the sentence remains to
be served under parole supervision. In contrast, the most promising prisoners will be released early and will have long years of unexpired sentence to

serve on parole. S. 1 follows the Brown Commission lead in abolishing this
irrational correction program, providing instead that all prisoners serving
substantial sentences shall eventually be released under parole for periods
1 16
roughly proportionate to the period of actual confinement.
In speaking of "consensus reforms" in this section of the Article, I
may be overstating the matter. One sector of the community appears to have
rejected reform: the organized federal judiciary. Speaking in the name of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Chief Justice Burger addressed a
letter to Congress opting in favor of "existing laws," on the ground that
having to adapt their jury charges to new laws would be an "enormous
burden" on federal judges. 117 That this institutional and personal concern of
§ 841(b) (1970) (special, longer parole terms apply for narcotics offenses that extend beyond the
term of imprisonment). See also 3 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 1047.
116. Compare COMMISSION CODE §§ 3201(2), 3403(2) with S. I §§ 2303, 3834. There are
radical differences between the two approaches to the problem. The Commission envisioned
the parole period as falling inside the maximum sentence legislatively authorized. S. I makes
parole an addition to the legislatively prescribed term or any shorter term imposed by the
sentencing judge, and permits the Parole Commission to set the duration of parole within
specified statutory limits. S. 1 § 3834. This makes it difficult to compare the general level of
severity of the two codes, because the legislative maxima do not reflect differences in maximum period of confinement. The Commission's maxima must be reduced by the period of
mandatory parole, whereas an S. I sentence may have to be served out in prison, to be followed
by as much as five years of parole, which of course carries a contingent threat of further
imprisonment for behavior that is not necessarily criminal but merely violative of the conditions
of parole.
Substantial liberalization of S. l's original parole provisions was incorporated in the
January 15, 1975 version. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM AcT OF 1975 1077-78 (Comm. Print 1976) (draft committee report accompanying the revised bill).
117. Letter from Chief Justice Warren Burger to Congress (May 12, 1976). The letter reads
as follows:
By direction of the Judicial Conference of the United States I transmit to you
herewith a report unanimously approved by the Judicial Conference at its session on
April 7, 1976, concerning H.R. 10850 and related bills pertaining to the proposed new
Federal Criminal Code. This report deserves careful study by your committee.
Permit me to call attention again to the searching discussion at the earlier
Conference meeting in which the essence of the Conference view was that the
enactment of this Code, as distinguished from a less complex recodification of
existing laws, will impose an enormous burden on all federal courts for a long period
in the future. Just how long, no one can safely predict. This will arise from the need
to restructure jury instructions for every new definition of criminal acts, in order to
comport with the new Code, and from the appellate review of elements of those
instructions by each of the Courts of Appeals and ultimately by this Court.
I feel obliged also to call attention again to the unanimous resolution of the
Conference of Metropolitan Chief Judges opposing the enactment of the proposed
new Code. Its members are the 23 Chief Judges of the larger federal districts which
together are responsible for more than one-half of all cases in the federal courts.
See Denniston, Did BurgerLetterHelp Kill CriminalCodeReform Bill?, Washington Star, July
27, 1976, at A-2, col. 1.
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judges should be treated by them as the paramount consideration, blocking
not only current reform efforts but also any future pervasive or systematic
reform, is astonishing and disturbing. Perhaps, however, the Burger letter
has been misunderstood. The Judicial Conference of April, 1973 accepted
the notably favorable report of its Committee on the Administration of the
Criminal Law" t8 and subsequently transmitted it to Congress. The Conference also "[a]pproved in principle the proposal for a new or amended
Federal Criminal Code," 119 and directed the Committee to continue its close
study of particular provisions. The continuing labors of the Committee were
noted in reports of subsequent proceedings of the Conference. 120 Although
Committee reports had referred to the task of revising jury instructions, it
was only in the Report of the Judicial Conference of September, 1975, that
this consideration suddenly assumed major significance. In a paragraph
preceding the usual Conference note of the Committee's on-going studies,
the Judicial Conference declared that its "views . . . as previously reported, reflected opposition to this [S. 1] legislation.' 12 1 This statement is
somewhat ambiguous in light of the fact that no explicit opposition appears
in earlier Judicial Conference reports1 22 nor in the Judicial Conference
118. We express general approval of the objectives sought and methods utilized in the
reform of the federal criminal laws by all three approaches [Le., Brown Commission,
S. 1, and a Department of Justice draft introduced as S. 1400]. The President and
distinguished members of Congress have commended the Brown Commission for its
magnificent endeavors. The work of the Commission demonstrated not only keen
insight and scholarship, but represented an effort to comply with the spirit of criminal
law reform begun by the American Law Institute in 1952 and completed ten years
later with the publication of the "Proposed Official Draft" of the Model Penal Code.
Report of the Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference
of the United States (Apr. 5, 1973).
119. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 15 (April 5-6,
1973).
120. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 78-79 (Sept.
13-14, 1973); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OFTHE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 22 (March

7-8, 1974); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 56-57

(Sept.

25-26, 1975); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 12 (April

7, 1976).
121. The paragraph, derived from the Report of the Committee on the Administration of the
Criminal Law read as follows:
The views expressed on S.1, as previously reported, reflected opposition to this
legislation on the ground that it contemplates unnecessarily sweeping redefinition of
all federal crimes and will require, among other things, (a) that every district judge
will be required to restructure and formulate new jury instructions to replace those
which have evolved on a literal "trial and error" basis for well over 100 years; (b) that
new instructions for newly defined crimes must then literally "run the gauntlet" of
courts of appeals; and (c) that ultimately the Supreme Court will be obliged to review
numerous cases to pass finally on the adequacy of the instructions required by the
new code. In the present state of overcrowded dockets at every level, the new and
complex burdens that S. 1 will impose on the federal courts are incalculable. The
Conference nevertheless continues to comply with congressional requests for comments on specific parts of S. 1.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 56 (Sept. 25-26, 1975).
One does not know which "views. . .previously reported" are referred to, nor what is meant
by "reflected opposition" as distinguished from "reflected concern" or "directly opposed."
122. The only indication that there was a divergence of viewpoints on S.1 can be seen in the
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Report of April 7, 1976, where the federal criminal code and the work of the
Committee are discussed.1 23 One can only hope that improvement in the law
has not been rejected by the federal judges on the ground that they are too
busy. Certainly state experience with recently enacted comprehensive codes
offers no support for the view that judges will be intolerably burdened
during the period of transition from the archaic to the modern. 124
IV.

HUBRIS AND REPRESSION ON THE RIGHT

Federal penal reform foundered in the Ninety-fourth Congress despite
consensus on many major advances. This temporary check was due to the
determination of conservatives to have their bill carry numerous "hardline" features that the Brown Commission had rejected, and to demagogic
opposition from the Left, directed not only against the repressive features of
S. 1 but against S. 1 in its entirety.
The first destructive element of the hubris of the Right was overambition. Instead of restricting S. 1 to a substantive criminal law with technical
amendments necessary to fit the project into the United States Code, the
Senate Subcommittee chose to recapitulate, with modifications, the entire
range of the criminal justice system. Thus, S. 1 has sections on investigative
and law enforcement authority generally, 125 wire-tapping 12 6 and witness
13 1
130
immunity, 127 extradition, 28 venue, 29 counsel for the indigent, bail,
treatment of juveniles and the insane, 132 pre-trial procedure, 133 rules of
Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States for March 6-7, 1975.
Acting on the report of the Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law and analyzing
various provisions of S. 1, the Conference made the following statement:
In discussing S. 1 members of the Conference again expressed great concern that
if this legislation is enacted, new forms of jury instructions will be required and
appellate courts will be called upon to review the correctness of new instructions and
that all of these factors will have a serious impact on the work of all federal courts.
Members of the Conference continued to express the view that a traditional
recodification of the existing statutes would serve all the purposes of a completely
new code redefining federal crimes. Some expressed the view that if such a comprehensive code is to replace all present federal criminal statutes, the present time
was most inappropriate in view of the rising caseloads, new classes of litigation and
the adjustments necessary to meet the Speedy Trial Act over the next five years.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

19-20 (March 6-7,

1975).
123. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 12 (April 7,
1976).
124. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
125. S. I §§ 3001-3018.
126. Id. §§ 3101-3109.
127. Id. §§ 3111-3115.
128. Id. §§ 3211-3217.
129. Id. §§ 3311-3313.
130. Id. §§ 3401-3405.
131. Id. §§ 3501 et. seq.
132. Id. §§ 3601 et. seq.
133. Id.§§ 3701-3702.
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evidence, 134 forfeiture proceedings, 135 the internal operations of the Parole
Commission, 36 and the establishment of a new Victim Compensation
Fund. 137 Most of this was unobjectionable and some was even progressive,
but the bill was distended to become an intimidating document of over 750
pages. 138 Given the provocative character of the Subcommittee's proposed
innovations relating to substantive law, opponents could be forgiven for
viewing with suspicion these extra hundreds of dense pages represented as
largely restatements of existing law, but never having been reviewed by the
Brown Commission. In short, the opposition's target had been broadened
and rendered more vulnerable.
The major departures from the Commission Code proposed in S. 1,
while disastrous from the point of view of liberal democratic policy, were
perhaps most objectionable because they gravely impaired the chances of
getting any reform at all enacted. While disagreement as to capital punishment and gun control could hardly be avoided, a review of conservative
insistence on other issues such as censorship and the defense of insanity
serves to illustrate the excess of zeal that has so endangered the reform
program.
A.

The "Official Secrets" Provisions

Recollection of the Pentagon Papers case and continuing paranoia in
the White House about "leaks" to the news media led to the inclusion in S.
1 of the notorious provision making unauthorized disclosure of "classified
information" a felony. 139 Even after being watered down from earlier
versions, 14° the proposal for an "Official Secrets Act," as it came to be
called in the press, was horrendous. Classified information was defined as
any information "marked or designated" pursuant to a statute or regulation
134. Id. §§ 3711-3715.
135. Id. §§ 4001-4005.
136. Id. §§ 3831-3837.
137. Id. §§ 4111-4115.
138. The facts that approximately 500 pages of the bill consisted of conforming amendments
raising no separate substantive issues, and that tax bills, as well as other complex legislation,
are often of comparable length did not moderate the opposition's exploitation of the awesome
size of S. 1. See notes 296, 299 infra and accompanying text. See also Part VII of this Article.
139. S. I § 1124. The section provided that:
A person is guilty of an offense, if, being or having been in authorized possession or

control of classified information, or having obtained such information as a result of
his being or having been a federal public servant, he knowingly communicates such

information to a person who is not authorized to receive it.
Id. § 1124(a). Both present law and the Commission Code, of course, contain provisions
punishing the betrayal of certain narrowly defined classes of secrets such as diplomatic or
military codes, 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1970), nuclear technology, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2274, 2298(b) (1970)
and basic defense plans and weaponry, 50 U.S.C. § 783 (1970). See COMMISSION CODE § 1114.
140. The Subcommittee yielded to some public and senatorial criticism by adding a provi-

sion to section 1124 excepting from its purview the recipients of unlawfully disclosed classified
material. 2 SUBCOMmiTrEE REPORT 244-45; see S. I § 1124(b).
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as "requiring a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure

for reasons of national security.""'4 Thousands of underlings in the civil and
military establishments would thus be authorized to impose restraints on the

right of the public to know what the government was doing, and this at a
time when the country was moving in the opposite direction by enacting
"sunshine laws" to assure public access to information about bureaucratic
decision-making processes. 142 That the information "was not lawfully subject to classification" was declared to be no defense, 143 but the Subcommit-

tee sought to mollify critics with putative safeguards against prosecution for
disclosing "classified information" which should never have been so classified or which should long since have been declassified. Prosecution was to

be barred unless a government agency had been established to review
classifications. 144 The head of that agency, the head of the classifying
agency, and the Attorney General would all have to certify prior to the
return of an indictment that the information had been lawfully classified. 145

A final striking bit of overreaching was the explicit penalizing of

"unauthorized disclosure" even to members of Congress; only a "lawful
demand" (a subpoena?) from a "regularly constituted" congressional committee was acceptable as an "affirmative defense," ie., with the burden of

proof on the defendant. 146 The spectacle of criminal prosecution of an
honest and patriotic civil servant who had revealed shenanigans in defense
contracting to a Congressman was alone sufficient to generate and to justify
the revulsion that greeted section 1124. Unfortunately, that revulsion was
easily extended to S. 1 generally, as the news media of the United States
turned this into the central issue in the legislation.

A barbed bait was thrown to the press in the form of a provision that the
receiver of an unauthorized disclosure could not be prosecuted as an ac-

complice of the discloser or for conspiracy with or solicitation of the
141. S.I § 1128(b).
142. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. 1976).
143. S. I § 1124(e). However, a defense was accorded where a defendant "had attempted to
obtain the declassification of the information and had exhausted all administrative remedies
....
Id. § 1124(d)(2)(e). Even such a mythically persistent dissident bureaucrat would have
no defense of illegality if anyone, for example, a news reporter, gave him "anything of value"
(legal expenses?) in return for disclosure. Id. § 1124(d)(2)(B). Moreover, assuming all other
hurdles were overcome, the accused still had the burden of proving that the classification was
indeed unlawful, thus reversing the presumption of innocence with regard to the central issue of
culpability.
144. Id. § 1124(c). The Subcommittee thought that the Interagency Classification Review
Committee, an existing agency established by Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1974),
satisfied this requirement. See 2 SUBcoMMIrrE REPORT 246.
145. S. I § 1124 (c)(2).
146. Id. § 1124(d)(1). It should be noted that this narrow exemption derives from existing
law, 18 U.S.C. §798(c) (1970), and from section 1114(4) of the Commission Code. Both of those
sections, however, deal with narrow categories of "classified" information, with respect to
which narrow exemptions might be considered appropriate.
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principal offender. 147 But the Subcommittee Report made it clear that prosecution of newsmen for illegal receipt of "national defense information,"
whether classified or not, would be possible under proposed section 1123(a)
(2)(b) which required a person in unauthorized possession of national defense information to "deliver it promptly to a federal public servant who is
entitled to receive it."148 The American press did not take the bait. Both the
press and the public perceived that first amendment values were being
subverted not only by direct threats to newsmen but also by efforts to choke
off sources within the bureaucracy. Many Americans believe that "leaks"
from the bureaucracy are a bastion of popular control of government and,
therefore, of democracy and liberty. Suspicion of the "Official Secrets
Act" was further intensified by common knowledge that intentional leaks
relating to vital elements of international policy and security are a common
feature of "news management" by the highest executive officers.
S. l's incursions on freedom of speech were not confined to section
1124. They were found also in the treatment of espionage, sedition and
conspiracy, theft of information, obscenity, and "impairing a government
149
function. "
B.

Abolishing the Insanity Defense
Repeal of the insanity defense in S. 1 is another example of jeopardizing progress by encumbering the bill with impolitic and provocative features. Insanity was recognized as a defense only if the mental defect caused
a lack of "the state of mind required as an element of the offense
charged." 150 This means, for example, that a defendant who cut his wife's
throat would be acquitted if he was so crazy as to believe that he was merely
slicing cheese, for then he would not have had the intent to kill required for
murder. But if he insanely supposed that his wife was poisoning him, or that
God required him to dispose of his wife, he would be convicted. Present
law, approved not only by the Brown Commission 5 ' but also by the
American Law Institute' 52 and all of the federal courts of appeal, 153 acquits
the defendant (with appropriate provision for civil constraint) if he "lacks
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to con147. Id. § 1124(b). See note 140 supra.
148. S. 1 § 1123(a)(2)(b); see 2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 244-45. Although this offense is a
carryover from existing law rather than an innovation by S. 1, see id., the cover of the ACLU
pamphlet STOP S-I carried the statement: "Did you read the Pentagon Papers in your newspaper? S. I could put the paper's editors in jail." ACLU, STOP S-1 (undated pamphlet).
149. The subject is elaborated on in Schwartz, supra note 4, at 3203.
150. S. 1 § 522.
151. COMMISSION CODE § 503.
152. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
153. See I COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS 230-34.
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form his conduct to the requirements of law." 1 54 Failure to accord a
defendant such a defense is to ignore the relevance of moral responsibility
and power of choice to guilt. Further, it serves to apply the gravest sanctions
of the system of deterrence, the criminal law, against people who are
undeterrable. In effect, S. 1 abolished the defense of insanity, since lack of
the required criminal intent would be a defense under the Code whether or
not the defendant was insane. Thus S. 1 treated the sane and the insane
alike. This radical departure from fundamental notions of culpability in
crime follows two decades of intense consideration of the subject by the
courts and commissions, resulting in a remarkable unanimity among legis55
lators and courts in favor of the Commission's position.1
It is far from clear that the formula proposed in S. 1 would even
accomplish the proponents' purpose to exclude a perplexing issue from trial
by jury, to limit the role of psychiatrists and to increase the number of
murder convictions. 15 6 This is so because section 522 left untouched the
requirement of proving criminal intent, and it recognized that mental illness
may negate criminal intent. Psychiatrists, then, would assuredly be found to
give expert opinions that homicidal intent was precluded by the defendant's
insanity. Opposing experts would be marshalled. Juries would continue to
be bombarded with confounding testimony. The only difference would be
that judges would instruct on impairment of intent rather than impairment of
the defendant's ability to conform to the law. Juries would continue to
convict or acquit in response to inarticulate feelings of justice. It is true that
many of the foregoing unsatisfactory features are also found in trials of the
insanity issue under present law, but if they cannot be eliminated, and are
instead only aggravated by the S. 1 proposal, there is surely no justification
for a radical innovation that calls for disregarding issues of culpability.
C.

Harsh Sentencing

Sentencing is the core of a criminal code, and it is here that the
contrasts between S. 1 and the Commission Code were most pervasive and
significant. Ironically, this aspect of the reform, directly concerned with
deprivation of liberty and overbroad official discretion, received the least
attention from civil liberties organizations and the press. Perhaps this is due
to the fact that sentencing issues are not concentrated in a single, highly
visible provision, and can be appreciated only by analyzing sections dealing
with maximum and minimum terms, probation, parole, consecutive sen154.

COMMISSION CODE § 503.
155. The proposed abolition had some academic, bar association and psychiatric support,
see 2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 112-13, and had indeed been favored by the Brown Commission's
consultant in this area. I COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS 247-54.
156. See 2 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 109-11.
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tences, special sentences for dangerous offenders and appellate review of
sentence.
The sentences prescribed in S. 1 for particular offenses were not always
higher than those recommended by the Brown Commission. 157 Looking at a
single provision, one might conclude that S. 1 was sometimes more lenient
than the Commission Code. While S. 1 provided for parole eligibility after
the prisoner had served one-quarter of his term, 158 for example, the Com159
mission contemplated service of one-third of the imposed prison term.
But these appearances were deceptive, as the following discussion will
show.
1. Excessive maximum terms. The key to comparison of the maximum terms provided in S. 1 and the Commission Code is to remember that
the maxima prescribed in S. 1 were supplemented by extended terms for
specially dangerous offenders 16 0 and by parole terms of as much as five
years. 16 1 In contrast, the maxima set forth in the Commission Code include a
portion reserved only for specially dangerous offenders' 62 as well as a
"mandatory parole" term, that is, the terminal portion of the sentence that
is to be served outside prison (absent parole violation). 163 An example will
help to clarify the difference between these two sentencing schemes.
Perjury was a Class D felony under S. 1164 and a Class C felony under
the Commission Code. 1 65 Each of these categories entailed a stated maximum of seven years. 166 To the seven-year maximum under S. 1 there would
have to be added the possibility of a seven-year extended sentence for
recidivists, professional criminals or other specially dangerous types, 167 and
a parole term which might be as much as five years.1 68 The S. 1 maximum,
therefore, would be nineteen years if calculated on the same basis as
sentences under the Commission Code. A specially dangerous perjurer
convicted under the Commission Code, on the other hand, would be subject
to a maximum total sentence-including extended sentence and parole-of
169
seven years.
157. Compare S. I §§ 1641, 2301(b)(3) (fifteen years for rape) with COMMISSION CODE §§
1641, 3201(l)(a) (thirty years).
158. S. I § 2301(d).
159. COMMISSION CODE § 3201(3).
160. S. I §§ 2301(c), 2302(b).
161. Id. § 3834(b).
162. COMMISSION CODE § 3202.
163. Id. § 3201(2).
164. S. 1 § 1341(b).
165. COMMISSION CODE § 1351(1).
166. S. 1 § 2301(b)(4); COMMISSION CODE § 3201(1)(c).
167. S. 1 § 2301(c).
168. Id. §§ 2303(a), 3834(b).

169. If the convicted perjurer were not a specially dangerous offender, the maximum
sentence he could be given under the Commission Code would be five years. COMMISSION CODE
§ 3202(1). The comparable maximum under S. 1 would be twelve years-a seven-year maximum
prison term and a five-year maximum term of parole. S. I §§ 2301(b)(4), 3834(b).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1977:171

Additional differences can be identified by examining the parole provisions under the two codes. A perjurer convicted under the Commission
Code and sentenced to the seven-year maximum could be released by the
Parole Board after serving one year, 170 should be released as soon as the
Board believes that no purpose is served by continued confinement, 17 1 and
must be released on parole after serving four years and eight months. 172 On
the other hand, the perjurer convicted under S. 1 and sentenced to the
fourteen-year maximum prison term might have to serve a minimum term in
prison of three and one-half years. 173 While the Parole Commission would
have to consider the parole of the prisoner at the end of such maximum term
(or after each year of imprisonment if no term of parole ineligibility were
set), 174 it would not be required to release him until he had served out all
175
fourteen years.
The simplest way to ameliorate the harsh S. 1 maxima would be to
provide that the parole component of the sentence be deducted from those
maxima rather than added to them. Similarly, the extended term for specially dangerous offenders should not be added to the stated maximum, but
rather should be conceived as a portion of the ordinary maximum reserved
for the exceptionally dangerous, as under the Commission Code.176 The
adoption of the same principle in S. 1 would tame the ferocity of S. l's
maxima, and would comport with the obvious congressional intent expressed in existing maxima, namely that they go much higher than is appropriate for the ordinary offender.
2. Probationdiscretion. S. 1 directed the sentencing judge to consid170. COMMISSION CODE § 3402(l).

171. The Commission Code provides that, after the first year of imprisonment, a prisoner
sentenced to more than three years in prison
shall be released on parole, unless the [Parole] Board is of the opinion that his release
should be deferred because:

(a) there is undue risk that he will not conform to reasonable conditions of
parole;

(b) his release at the time would unduly depreciate the seriousness of his crime
or undermine respect for law;
(c) his release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
(d) his continued correctional treatment, medical care or vocational or other
training in the institution will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding
life if he is released at a later date.

Id. It should be noted that a sentencing judge could set a minimum prison term in certain
circumstances. Id. § 3201(3).

172. Id. § 3402(3). The section provides in part that: "The parole component of (a] maximum
term shall be . . . one-third for terms of nine years or less . . . ." Id. § 3201(2).
173. "The authorized terms of imprisonment for felonies that may be required to be served
prior to eligibility for parole are not more than one-fourth the term authorized ....
" S. I §
2301(d).

174. Id. §§ 3831(b), (d).
175. Id. § 3831(c).
176. COMMISSION CODE § 3202(1). See note 169 supra.
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er a fairly conventional list of factors relevant to the grant or denial of
probation, but, unlike the Commission Code, emphasized those factors
pointing towards the "need" for imprisonment for retributive or deterrent
purposes.177 Notably, S. 1 failed to state that prison should be resorted to
only if the judge were satisfied that it was the more appropriate disposition.
Such a preference for probation had been espoused by the Brown Commission, 178 the American Law Institute 179 and the American Bar Association
Project on Standards for Criminal Justice. 180 The omission of a stated
preference in S. 1 meant that no judge would have to face up to this crucial
issue, and that different judges would operate on different assumptions as to
where the "burden of proof" lay on the issue of imprisonment versus
probation. The failure to declare legislative policy on this point was aggravated by excluding from appellate review the refusal of a judge to grant
probation, except where he imposed a long prison sentence. 181
The probation provisions of S. 1 were defective in two other important
respects. In contrast to the Commission Code, which contained no exclusions from eligibility for probation, 8 2 S. 1 excluded from probation all
184 and drug offenders. 185
Class A offenders, 8 3 criminals who used guns,
The main effect of these provisions would be to vest discretion as to
probation, ordinarily a judicial function, in the prosecutor, who would make
the effective decision regarding eligiblity for probation when he selected the
specific charges to bring and the plea bargains to accept.
3. Consecutive sentencing. The Brown Commission's provisions on
consecutive sentences embodied three important principles: (1) consecutive
sentences were flatly precluded in certain instances; 186 (2) even where
177.

S. I § 2102(a) directs the sentencing judge to consider:

(1)the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; and
(2) the need for the sentence imposed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational train-

ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
178. COMMISSION CODE § 3101(2):

The court shall not impose a sentence of imprisonment upon a person unless,
having regard to the nature of the circumstances of the offense and to the history and
character of the defendant, it is satisfied that imprisonment is the most appropriate
sentence for the protection of the public ....
179. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
180.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAND-

ARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 1.3 (Approved Draft, 1970).

181. S. 1§ 3725(a)(1)(B).
182. COMMISSION CODE § 3101(1).

183.
184.
185.
186.

S. I§ 2101(a).
Id.§ 1823(b).
Id.§ 1811(b).
Consecutive sentences could not be imposed for crimes whose prohibition protects the

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1977:171

permitted, there would be a low 'ceiling on the aggregate of consecutive
sentences; 8 7 and (3) the use of consecutive sentences was in any event
confined to cases where "exceptional features" required such action "for
reasons which the court shall set forth in detail."' 8 8
The corresponding provisions of S. 1 did not deal adequately with any
of these principles. A conspiracy sentence could be added to a sentence for
the target substantive offense. 18 9 A sentence for possessing a gun during the
190
commission of a crime not only could but had to be made consecutive,
even though the crime itself carried a high maximum penalty, as in the case
of robbery, because it commonly involves use of weapons.
4. Parole discretion. Under S. 1400, the Nixon Administration bill
which was eventually consolidated with S. 1, the Parole Commission would
have been required to make five difficult findings before parole could be
granted: that release would not be inconsistent with "just punishment"; that
it "would not undermine the affording of adequate deterrence"; that there
would be no "undue risk" of further criminality; that it would not adversely
affect institutional discipline; and that further "correctional treatment"
would not improve the prisoner's "capacity to lead a law-abiding life." 19 1
Proof of a negative is notoriously difficult; proof of these negatives verges
on the impossible, for they involve such issues as what constitutes "just
punishment" or "adequate deterrence," as well as predictions of future
behavior.
Accordingly, the parole provisions of S. 1 presented one of the central
issues in reform of the federal criminal law, since they bore on length of
confinement, on the degree to which Congress would prescribe guidance for
one of the most important yet least xeviewable administrative decisions in
government, and on the fundamental principle that detention is not to be
imposed or prolonged unless someone is satisfied that it serves a purpose. In
contrast, under S. 1, detention would be prolonged until someone was
satisfied that it served no purpose. The fundamental principle of equal
justice was violated by the formula that parole "may" be granted but need
same interest with varying degrees of specificity, crimes which are part of a single course of
conduct or crimes which involve substantially the same criminal objective. COMMISSION CODE §
3204(2)(c).

187. Generally, the aggregate of consecutive sentences could not exceed the statutory
maximum for an offense of the next level above any offense covered by the sentence. Id. §
3204(3). So also, consecutive sentences were barred where one offense was "included" in the
other, id. § 3204(2)(a), or was only an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit the other.
Id. § 3204(2)(b).
188. Id. § 3204(5).
189. This conclusion is reached by noting the absence of any limitation on such a sentence in
the section on multiple sentences. See S. I § 2304.
190. Id. § 1823(b).
191. S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4202(d) (1973). These provisions, with some modifications, were incorporated in S. 1 § 3831(c).
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not be, even when the difficult proof requirements are met, so that prisoner
A stays in jail while indistinguishable prisoner B goes free. 192 It is noteworthy that the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976 mandates
parole (1) when release would not "jeopardize the public welfare," "depreciate the seriousness" of the offense, or "promote disrespect for the law,"
and (2) after service of two-thirds of sentences upwards of five years unless
the Parole Commission determines that the prisoner has seriously and
frequently violated institution rules or that there is a "reasonable probability" that he will re-engage in crime. 193
5. Appellate review of sentence. Under section 3725 of S. 1, a
defendant could have his sentence reviewed only in felony cases where the
sentence imposed exceeded one-fifth of the authorized maximum. 194 This
would deny review of misdemeanor sentences, although they might involve
several years of imprisonment (in the case of multiple misdemeanors), while
permitting review of felony sentences involving fines only. It would also
deny appeal from prison sentences as long as six years where the authorized
maximum was thirty years. If a cut-off is necessary, it ought to be such as to
allow review of any sentence beyond six months or a year. In addition, a
defendant should be allowed review of a decision denying probation even if
he is not allowed to challenge the length of his sentence. The difference
between probation and no probation, that is, the decision whether or not the
defendant goes to jail at all, is clearly more important than the precise length
of sentence. Because of that importance, S. 1 proposed to allow the prosecution to appeal any decision in favor of probation.1 95 A corresponding appeal
by the defense of a denial of probation would seem only fair.
S. 1 was overly generous to the government by permitting it to seek
review of a sentence whenever a trial judge put a defendant on probation and
192. The Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association favored a "presumption

for probation," but declined to follow the Brown Commission on the desirability in parole
proceedings of a similar preference for release unless the Parole Board believed that continued
imprisonment served some public purpose. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION, POLICY REGARDING S. I-THE PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE App. A, at 19, 24
(1975) (report to the House of Delegates). The report misstated the issue in referring to a
"presumption. . . that all prisoners, no matter how long their sentences, should be paroled at
the completion of the first six months." Id. at 24. There is no such presumption. On the
contrary, given the criteria including "just punishment," a rational parole board could hardly
release serious offenders early in the parole period. The Brown formulation simply recommends that parole thinking be oriented not towards detention unless there is ground for release
(the "mercy"--Le., retributive-approach) but to release unless detention serves some purpose, even the retributive. Moreover, under the Commission Code as well as S. 1, the parole
board's decision against parole is not reviewable except on procedural or constitutional
grounds, COMMISSION CODE § 3406, thus emphasizing the precatory character of the parole

guidance provisions.
193. Pub. L. No. 94-233, § 4206(a),(d), 90 Stat. 223.
194. S. 1 § 3725(a).
195. Id. § 3725(a)(2)(B).
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whenever he set a prison term below three-fifths of S. I's high maxima. 196
This generosity is especially dangerous in view of the authority which S. 1
conferred upon the appellate court to increase a sentence under review upon
petition of the government.1 97 Thus, threats by prosecutors to seek review
and increase of sentence could be employed to discourage defendants from
seeking review.
6. Miscellaneous. The foregoing criticisms call for extensive revision
of S. l's sentencing provisions. In the course of that revision, other improvements should be sought. It would be helpful to incorporate section
2301(a), the general section on sentencing, into a declaration of congressional policy that sentences (both legislative maxima and terms actually
imposed) should be related to specified goals. For example, a sentence
motivated solely or predominantly by deterrence should normally be quite
short; a goal of incapacitation suggests a longer confinement, which may
98
incidentally reflect also some element of "just punishment."' 1
The concept that terms should be related to the goals of sentencing,
whether articulated in section 2301 or elsewhere, would furnish a rationale
for deciding how many classes of offenses to set up in the Code. Section
2301 of S. 1 provided nine classes, not counting a tenth provided in effect
by the division of Class A felonies into capital and non-capital categories.
There simply are not that many different useful categories of criminality for
sentencing purposes. The Brown Commission proposed six categories, or
only five if one sets apart "infractions," a category of offenses for which
only fines could be imposed.1 99 Increasing the number of categories is
chiefly a reflection of the retributive impulse; the legislator desires an array
of finely-graduated classes of crime to which he can assign particular
offenses in accordance with his intuitive assessment of the relative seriousness of the offense. The logical end of this process is the chaos of existing
law, under which Congress has established one hundred or more categories
of offenses punishable by distinct sentence maxima, 2°° although concededly
most of this present differentiation among offenses is the result of inadvertence and irrational fluctuations of retributive temper in the successive
Congresses that enacted particular criminal laws. The pressure on the
draftsman to create intermediate retributive categories is particularly strong
when, as the staff proposed to the Commission, the maximum short-term
sentence for a misdemeanor (imposed for purely deterrent purposes) should
196. Id. § 3725(a)(2).
197. Id. § 3725(d)(2)(B).
198. Compare Senator Kennedy's proposal for a federal sentencing commission to promulgate guidelines for trial judges. S. 2699, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This bill was co-sponsored
by Senators McClellan and Hruska.
199. COMMISSION CODE § 3002.
200. See STUDY DRAFT xxxii-xxxiii.
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be three or six months while the maximum for the lowest felony grade might
be in the neighborhood of four years. In vain did we argue that intermediate
maxima like.one year or two years were gratuitously severe from a deterrent
point of view and would usually be inadequate from the point of view of
incapacitation or rehabilitation. The Commission itself adopted a one-year
maximum for misdemeanors, 20 1 and S. 1 intercalated a low-grade felony
20 2
carrying a three-year maximum.
Short-term imprisonment precludes any rehabilitation program, and
there is no basis for believing that there is a significant deterrence differential between thirty days, six months or one year. Accordingly, misdemeanor
penalties should be sharply restricted except for "persistent misdemeanants." 20 3 S. 1 departed notably from the Commission Code by authorizing
imprisonment for "infractions."204
D.

Wiretapping
On two issues, wiretapping and entrapment, S.1 was not significantly
worse than existing law, 20 5 but the positions taken, needlessly in the case of
wiretapping, were calculated to arouse the sharpest opposition. Wiretapping
falls into the category of procedure and evidence, which the Brown Commission did not undertake to revise. 20 6 The Commission Code simply
penalized illegal wiretapping without addressing the question of the conditions under which wiretapping should be legal. 20 7 S. 1, on the other hand,
incorporated ("reaffirms," opponents said) provisions of existing law detested by the liberal community. In addition, the Subcommittee Report
added expansive glosses relating to warrantless eavesdropping in "emergencies, '"208 to eavesdropping on persons not named in the warrants but involved in the same suspected criminality, 2 9 and to the need for merely
"substantial compliance" with federal requirements to validate wiretapping
210
by state police.
201.

COMMISSION CODE § 3201(1)(d). The Study Draft presented a choice of a one-year,

six-month or three-month maximum for misdemeanors. STUDY DRAFr § 3204(a).
202.

S. I § 2301(b)(5). S. I also departed from the Commission Code by authorizing up to

five days imprisonment for "infractions." Compare S.1 § 2301(b)(9) with COMMISSION CODE §
3001(3).
203. See COMMISSION CODE § 3003 (defining a "persistent misdemeanant" as a person who
is convicted three times within five years for Class A misdemeanors or more serious crimes).
204. Compare S. 1 § 2301(b)(9) with COMMISSION CODE § 3001(3).

205. S. I §§ 3101-3109 substantially reenacted the arrangements for eavesdropping by
federal and state officials, sometimes with and sometimes without a warrant, which were
introduced into federal law by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2515-2519 (1970).
206. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.

207. COMMISSION CODE § 1561(2)(a).
208. 3 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 945-46.
209. Id. at 943.
210. Id. at 942.
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The original miscalculation regarding the desirable scope of reform
legislation led also to the "reaffirmation" in S. 1 of other extremely
controversial recent statutes. Thus section 3713 purported to render confessions admissible notwithstanding violation of the Miranda rules on interrogation of uncounseled suspects held in police custody; and section 3714
purported to render eyewitness testimony admissible regardless of improper
pretrial police influence upon the witness to make a desired identification.
That these sections were wholly or partially unconstitutional 2 11 could only
intensify the outrage felt by opponents of such needless "reaffirmation" of
congressional assaults on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Bill of
Rights.
E.

Entrapment

Under existing law, entrapment is handled as a substantive defense,
that is, it raises a question regarding the defendant's criminal intent.2 12 The
Brown Commission therefore could not finesse the issue by categorizing it
as one falling outside the range of its proposed reform of substantive penal
law. The basic question was whether the law should tolerate the conviction
of defendants for committing crimes which they were induced to commit by
improper pressure from police agents. Section 551 of S. 1, following
existing law, permitted such convictions. The culprit might have acted
"solely as a result of active inducement" by a law enforcement officer, but
the prosecution would nevertheless succeed if the culprit had been "predisposed" to commit the offense. 213 The Commission took the predisposition
issue out of the analysis and concentrated instead on the propriety of the
police behavior. The police would be free, under the Commission proposals, to set up an "opportunity to commit an offense," for example, to offer
to buy narcotics from a suspected seller. They would be forbidden only to
use "means likely to cause normally law-abiding persons to commit the
offense," 214 but that prohibition would apply without regard to the character
or predisposition of the target.
The Commission's position commends itself on the following grounds.
First, it gives clear guidelines to the police as to what society will tolerate in
211. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to inform suspects in
custody of their constitutional rights prior to interrogation); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.

218 (1967) (accused has right to have counsel present at post-indictment line-up); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (testimony that witnesses had identified defendant at illegal
line-up is inadmissible). But cf. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (no right to counsel at
post-indictment photographic display); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (no right to counsel
at pre-indictment show-up).
212. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
213. S. 1 § 551 (emphasis added).
214. COMMISSION CODE § 702(2).
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the way of police inducement. It does not say, as does S. 1: "You may go so
far sometimes and much further at other times (if the suspect is 'predisposed')," at the risk that a jury will later find that the suspect was not
sufficiently predisposed. Second, it avoids the perversion of criminal trials
into inquisitions regarding the accused's predisposition as manifested by his
alleged participation in prior offenses not involved in the present charge. It
is inconsistent with the whole tradition of Anglo-American law to try a man
for his character, or to make conviction or acquittal of two defendants, both
of whom have engaged in the same conduct with the same criminal intent,
dependent on their alleged criminal proclivities. Third, dealing with entrapment as a bar to prosecution on account of police impropriety rather than as
an element of the defendant's guilt is consistent with the handling of other
similar problems in criminal law, for example, the exclusion of coerced
confessions and illegally obtained evidence, where the government is barred
from exploiting its own lawlessness regardless of the defendant's guilt.
Fourth, treating entrapment as a bar lightens the burden of proof for the
prosecution, which will not then have to negate entrapment "beyond a
reasonable doubt."
F. Public Safety Orders;Riots
The Commission sought to narrow the scope of the ancient "riot"
offense, which permitted mass arrests without discriminating among leaders, followers and mere bystanders. 2 15 At the same time the Commission
wished to take realistic account of the difficulty police have under riot
conditions in distinguishing between participants and bystanders, and of the
need on occasion to require that even the rights of bystanders give way. For
this purpose the Commission proposed that superior police officials, in
controlling riots and promoting public safety, might issue reasonable orders
to move, disperse, or refrain from specified activities in the immediate
vicinity of the riot. Violations of such orders were to be "infractions" only,
that is, noncriminal finable offenses like traffic violations. 216 Under S. 1,
the public safety order could be given by any policeman or other public
servant without authorization by higher authority, and violation of this
217
minimal riot control measure could result in a five-day jail sentence.
215. See id. § 1801 et seq.
216. Id. § 1804. An additional desirable safeguard, proposed in STUDY DRAFT § 1804, would
have excluded police orders directed to news reporters, television cameramen and the like, to
discourage the not infrequent efforts of riot control forces to operate free of public surveillance. When the Study Draft was being considered by the Commission, I favored a broader

explicit exclusion of elective and other officials who might be interested in first-hand observation of the riot and control measures. The conservative wing of the Brown Commission
persuaded the Commission to drop these additional safeguards.
217. S. 1 §§ 1862, 2301(b)(9).
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Miscellaneous

This catalogue of repressive features of S. 1 may conclude with a
reference to the significant alteration S. 1 made in the Brown Commission's
statement of Purposes of the Code. 218 In the first place, S. 1 dropped the
Commission's declared purpose "to safeguard conduct that is without guilt
from condemnation as criminal. "219 That declaration was the closest that
either bill came to adopting the principle of "strict construction" of penal
laws; both bills call for construction "in accordance with the fair import of
their terms to effectuate the general purpose" of the Code.2 20 The more
conventional canon of strict construction is a relic of the ages when the
common law (i.e., judicial power to define crime) was sacrosanct and
legislation was regarded as a suspect intrusion. In a modern setting, strict
construction leads to absurd judicial results, to obstruction of clear legislative purpose and to extraordinary, self-defeating complexity of drafting as
legislators seek to anticipate every potential "strict construction."
Nevertheless, there is an important value to be preserved in having legislation drafted and interpreted with a sensitivity to the tendency of every
generalized prohibition to imperil behavior that is neutral or even desirable.
That was the teaching of the "purpose" which S. 1 deleted.
Second, S. 1 unmistakably emphasized retribution as the purpose to be
given priority in the interpretation and administration of the Code. Where
the Commission spoke of insuring public safety, 221 S. 1 spoke of
"assur[ing] just punishment.' '222 Some might think that these subtle shifts
of emphasis have little practical import, especially in a context that lists all
the usual (and inherently contradictory) goals of the criminal justice system:
deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation and, in the Commission Code as
well as in S. 1, "merited punishment." But we are dealing here with the
first attempt to articulate by federal legislation the complex goals of the
criminal justice system. To list the purposes, however contradictory and
however equivocal in aggregate effect, is to make sure that no consideration
is overlooked-legislators, judges and the public are thereby educated, and
counsel have a statutory text to invoke. But it is something of a disaster to go
further, pushing the priority of a "just deserts" philosophy and deprecating
the ancient wisdom that a penal law must not so zealously pursue the wicked
as to endanger the innocent.
V.

FLATULENCE ON THE LEFT: THE RHETORIC OF OPPOSITION

The provocation from the Right was great. The response from the Left
218. COMMISSION
219. Id.§ 102(d).

CODE §

102.

S. 1 § 112(a); Cf. COMMISSION CODE § 102, Comment.
221. COMMISSION CODE § 102(a).
222. S. 1 § 101(b)(1).

220.
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was demagogic, deceptive and probably counterproductive in the struggle to
promote liberty and justice. A mighty stench was generated to "STOP S.
1.223 The campaign did not discriminate between good provisions of S. 1
and the very bad provisions, nor between the bad provisions introduced by
S. 1 and the rest which merely retained existing law. On the contrary, the
Left insisted that the bill was so infused with fascism as to be unamendable.
Most disappointing was the failure of the Left to recognize that reform of the
criminal law was itself a civil liberties project that should enlist their fervent
support. Americans for Democratic Action, a leading left-of-center group,
did see the point, and combined its strong opposition to S. 1 with a powerful
affirmative statement on the need for reform. 224 The habituation of most
other civil liberties groups to being against perceived encroachments on
freedom prevented them in this instance from recognizing the affirmative
civil rights need for criminal law reform. They failed to comprehend that
positive legislation was essential in the field of criminal law as it was in the
field dealt with in the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968.225 The Left
mounted no campaign for criminal law reform. From the civil rights establishment came only an occasional, grudging, "We do not oppose revision of
the Federal Criminal Code," combined with a blanket condemnation of S. 1
as "inherently unamendable."226
223. The chief movers in the STOP S. I campaign were the American Civil Liberties Union,
the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation and the National Lawyers Guild.
224. The ADA position was as follows:

Versions of the federal criminal code developed by the McClellan subcommittee
of the Senate Judiciary Committee (S. 1) and the Department of Justice (S. 1400) are
repressive and regressive.
ADA calls for the support of a new federal criminal code along the lines
proposed by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws headed
by former Governor Pat Brown of California. Specifically, we:
1. oppose capital punishment and life sentences without possibility of parole;
2. oppose mandatory minimum sentences which preclude judicial adaptation of
sentence to individual cases, and invade the function of parole boards;
3. oppose the tendency to government censorship involved in regressive obscenity legislation and suggestions that executive classification of information should
be backed by criminal sanctions;
4. oppose the abolition of the defense of insanity as envisioned in S. 1400;
5. oppose imprisonment for possession and use of marijuana;
6. oppose indiscriminate incorporation of state and local penal law (often antiquated and medievally harsh) for federal enclaves;
7. insist upon effective national control of the private possession of handguns;
8. insist upon legislative formulation of standards for parole and probation,
with a presumption in favor of liberty unless the judge or parole board believes that
the goals of punishment are better served by imprisonment;
9. favor more local responsibility through a declaration in the federal code
against federalizing trivial local offenses, especially in areas like gambling, prostitution, petty frauds. The mere fact that the federal mails or a telephone call are
peripherally involved should not lead to federal involvement;
10. favor systematized grading of "regulatory offenses"-i.e., violations of
administrative rules involving no evil intent or substantial harm, and no manifest risk
to the interests of others-and elimination of imprisonment as a sanction for a first
offense of this type.
AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACrION, 1974 ADA NATIONAL POLICY 107.

225. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82
Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
226. Countryman & Emerson, What ConstitutionalAuthoritiesThink of the Bill!, in Nation-
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Alexander Hamilton, writing in The Federalistabout the opponents of
the constitutional proposal for an independent judiciary, referred to "the

rage for objection which disorders their imaginations and judgments.'

'227

He

might have said the same of the intemperate rhetoric of the Left when it
excoriated S. 1 as a plot by Nixon and his Watergate gang to enslave the
nation, to provide defenses for themselves in pending prosecutions, and to
facilitate future usurpations by the Executive Branch. The fact that John
Dean, who had participated in the White House "cover-up," had several
years before been a member of the Brown Commission staff was put

forward by some as an explanation for the Commission Code provisions on
mistake of law and performance of public duty which arguably would
exculpate the Watergate offenders. This argument ignored the fact that Dean
had nothing to do with the drafting of these sections, which indeed merely
followed Model Penal Code recommendations of the American Law Institute published a decade before the plots in the Nixon White House. If one
wished to make a plausible connection between Dean's work at the Brown
Commission and the debacle at the White House, it might better have been
this: Dean did work on portions of the Code having to do with perjury and
obstruction of justice; that work could well have sensitized him to the
danger of criminal prosecution for the cover-up, and so figured in his
decision, first, to warn his Chief and then to "blow the whistle," that is,
disengage himself from the conspiracy and cooperate with the pro228
secutors.
al Committee Against Repressive Legislation, Dangerous S.B.1 (brochure published by opponents of S. 1). Professors Countryman and Emerson went on to declare that "[t]he objective of
the draftsmen was to incorporate in the criminal code every restriction upon individual liberties,
every method and device, that the Nixon Administration thought necessary or useful in pursuit
of its fearful and corrupt policies." Id. This astonishing statement disregards not only the
numerous consensus libertarian reforms listed earlier, see notes 49-116 supra and accompanying text, but also such aspects of S. 1 as its harsh dealing with perjury and obstruction of
justice, see notes 164-75 supra and accompanying text, two offenses at the heart of the White
House conspiracy, and the several advances made by S. 1 in conventional civil liberties areas.
See notes 93-96 supra and accompanying text.
227. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 483 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton).

228. An interesting sidelight on Dean and the canard that he was a White House tool for
distorting the reform of the Code is provided by his work on the capital punishment controversy. Dean's employment at the Brown Commission had been sponsored by the conservative
members, and like them he favored capital punishment. When it came time to address this
issue, I decided to restrict the staff submission to a survey of preceding research and literature
because it was clear that any advocacy by me would be attributed to my known abolitionist
convictions and would persuade no one on the other side. I asked Dean, a known proponent of
capital punishment, to do the survey. After spending six weeks on the project he informed me
that, as a result of his reading, he had changed his mind. See 2 COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS

1347. His conservative sponsors were quite unhappy. Later, when Watergate broke, I found
myself being interviewed by press and broadcast media about my former employee. Some of
the interviewers insisted on interpreting these events as showing that Dean was "unprincipled"! Some might prefer the interpretation that Dean was intelligent, open-minded and
responsive to evidence.
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Mistake of Law; Superior Orders; the "Ehrlichman.Defense"

The main targets of the "STOP S. 1" campaign, apart from the
censorship issues discussed above 229 obviously calling for strenuous resistance, were the defenses which supposedly would exculpate perpetrators of
official crimes of the Watergate type, 230 and provisions that would supposedly authorize suppression of protests such as the anti-Vietnam War
demonstrations. 2 3
The controversy over the so-called Ehrlichman defense2 32 illustrates the
worst features of the "STOP S. 1" campaign. As will be shown below, the
S. 1 proposal was misinterpreted. Even as misinterpreted, it erred, if at all,
on the side of civil liberty, not against it. 233 Moreover, even if the provision
could indeed be construed to exculpate the architects of the Watergate
cover-up, that loophole could be closed by a single clarifying amendment.
Instead, the Left chose to hold the entire penal reform proposal hostage to a
dubious interpretation of a peripheral provision. Finally, it may be noted
that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, speaking largely through
Chief Judge Bazelon-whose civil libertarian badge is as shiny as anyone's-has recently vindicated the policy position challenged by ACLU and
NCARL. Precisely in the cases of Ehrlichman and the "footsoldiers" who
obstructed justice or burglarized on orders from the White House, the court
sustained convictions against high officials despite their incredible claims of
good faith reliance on superiors, 234 but drew the line against treating as
criminals underlings who act in good faith reasonably believing that they
were executing official duties lawfully defined for them by seemingly
responsible superiors. 235
The S. 1 sections in question are section 541 (exercise of public
authority), section 521 (mistake of law or fact) and section 552 (official
229. See text accompanying notes 139-49 supra.
230. From the cover of ACLU's pamphlet, STOPS-i: "Did you think the President's men

could claim they were just following orders? S. I could let them out of jail." ACLU, supra note
148, at 1.

231. From the cover of the ACLU pamphlet, STOP S-1: "Did you Protest the Vietnam
War? S. 1 could put you in jail." Id.
232. See United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45
U.S.L.W. 3764 (U.S. May 23, 1977). Former Presidential advisor John Ehrlichman asserted
that his order to break into the offices of a psychiatrist did not constitute taking part in a
conspiracy to violate the victim's civil rights because he was acting under an inexplicit mandate
from the President.
committee or the White House, as paranoid elements of the Left would have had it, but with the
liberal drafters of the Model Penal Code and the Brown Commission Code.
234. United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W.
3764 (U.S. May 23, 1977).
235. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The "footsoldiers" also won a
$200,000 settlement from the trustees of the Committee to Reelect the President in a lawsuit
based on their having been duped into committing illegal acts by false representations that the
government had sanctioned these acts. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
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misstatement of law). The corresponding sections of the Commission Code
are section 602 (execution of public duty), section 304 (ignorance or
mistake negativing culpability) and section 609 (mistake of law). In general,
these sections provide that activities which would be criminal for laymen are
not criminal for officials lawfully carrying out their public duties. The
public executioner is not a murderer. The policeman taking a lawfully
arrested suspect to the stationhouse is not a kidnapper. These propositions
are not controverted by anyone. Indeed, they are truisms or tautologies:
lawful action is not crime. Nevertheless, a code that purports to be comprehensive is incomplete if it contains unqualified condemnations of
homicide and abduction without explicitly recognizing that there may be
occasions when such behavior is justified. Controversy arises only in the
case of a person who acts on mistaken belief that he is so justified. Under
what circumstances should that belief be accepted as an excuse? In modern
law, excuse for reasonable mistake is quite broadly accepted, as in the case
of mistakes of fact in the exercise of the privileges of self-defense, defense
of habitation or prevention of violent felonies. The excuse is an application
of the general civil liberties principle that culpability ought to be proved
before the state may be allowed to punish.
Two refinements of the general rule of exculpation for reasonable
mistake must be considered in the present context. These relate to mistakes
of law and to actions taken while carrying out orders given by a superior.
Mistaken belief as to the coverage of the penal law itself is not an accepted
excuse unless the reasonableness of the mistake rests on some objective
foundation such as authoritative judicial interpretation or official pronouncement by responsible law enforcement agencies. 236 This limitation of excuse
is seen as necessary to prevent factitious defenses, perhaps based on the
advice of corrupt or ignorant lawyers. 237 On the other hand, mistake of law
will sometimes excuse even if the belief is unreasonable, where the special
kind of culpability required by the definition of an offense is negated by the
238
mistake.
236. S. I § 552; COMMISSION CODE § 609.

237. But see Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949) (defense in a bigamy prosecution
that accused reasonably believed, relying on counsel's opinion, that a foreign divorce from his
first wife was legally valid).
238. See S. 1 § 521; COMMISSION CODE § 304. See, e.g., Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959)
(no contempt of court in defying order to testify in reliance on honest belief, based on
attorney's advice, that respondent enjoyed the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (no deprivation of federally secured
civil rights without specific awareness that behavior is "that which the statute forbids"); People
v. Shaunding, 268 Mich. 218, 255 N.W. 770 (1934) (no larceny in the taking of goods of which
one believes himself the owner, though he is mistaken as to controlling law); People v. Weiss,
276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938) (no kidnapping if one supposes himself to be acting in
authorized collaboration with law enforcement agencies). For excellent surveys of the precedents on mistake of law, see I COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS 13541; 2 SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT
154-58.
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The "superior orders" defense supplements the mistake of law defense. It functions as a kind of presumption in certain hierarchical organizations (for example, the army) that a person authorized by society to issue
drastically enforceable commands knows what he is doing, knows whether
or not his command is lawful, and is entitled to obedience. Conversely, the
subordinate, upon whom society has laid a powerful duty of obedience, is
not ordinarily deemed culpable if he allows his duty to obey to outweigh
doubts as to the legality of the command; he is liabile only if he knows the
command is unlawful.2 3 9 The defense is not couched in terms of mistake of
law, reasonable or unreasonable, because in the typical situation in which it
is intended to operate, no legal opinion is being proffered or received.
Accordingly, the privilege to obey need not be circumscribed, like the
mistake of law defense, by requirements that the command emanate from a
high and responsible source or be in writing.
Against this background we may appraise the opposing positions in the
controversy over the "Ehrlichman defense." What emerges is that the Left
took a strikingly anti-civil liberties position. Trapped by its own volleys of
rhetoric against S. 1 as a McClellan-Nixon conspiracy, and responding only
to yesterday's headlines rather than to the lessons of history, it rushed into a
"law-and-order" position to the right of Senator McClellan on mistake of
law: subordinate public servants and ordinary citizens acting at the request
of even high officials were to be convicted of crimes without regard to their
good faith belief that they were following society's lawful mandate like
model or even heroic citizens. The paradoxical anti-civil libertarian thrust of
this reaction is strikingly demonstrated by the situations presented in Raley
v. Ohio240 and Cox v. Louisiana.24 1 In Raley, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the contempt convictions of witnesses who had refused to
testify before a state investigating committee on grounds of selfincrimination, after the committee had mistakenly advised the witnesses that
the privilege was available to them. The Court found this to be "an
indefensible sort of entrapment.' '242 In Cox, convictions for attempting to
obstruct justice by demonstrating "near" a courthouse were reversed because of evidence that the chief of police on the scene had opined that
parading across the street from the courthouse was not "near," although his
unwritten "official" interpretation was subsequently held erroneous .243 The
239. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (military orders); cf.
COMMISSION CODE § 602(2) (person who responds to public servant's directive to use force in
assisting him is exculpated unless the action directed is "plainly unlawful"). For a discussion of
the desirability of encouraging citizens to respond to apparently official calls for aid, see United
States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
240. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
241. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
242. 360 U.S. at 437-39, 443.
243. 379 U.S. at 568-72.
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position advocated by the Left would unavoidably have led to these convictions being upheld.
The civil liberties implications of a generous mistake of law/superior
orders defense are even broader than indicated by the foregoing illustrations
of their relation to the right to claim constitutional privileges or to exercise
freedom of speech and assembly. There are hundreds of thousands of public
servants whose duties involve arrest and search behavior ordinarily prohibited by law: customs officers, revenue agents, building guards, policemen,
firemen, investigating officials and so on. The line between what is lawful
for them to do and what is unlawful is notoriously vague, yet they are under
pressure zealously to do all that is lawful in carrying out their responsibilities. Excesses of zeal must be corrected, and in cases of gross and
willful abuse of official authority, they must be prosecuted as crimes. But
surely in a civilized society the correction of nonculpable transgressions of
vaguely defined authority should not be accomplished by criminal prosecution where the servant acted in good faith obedience to seemingly lawful
directions of high authorities. It is the errant high authorities who are shown
to be at fault, and such correction as is required for too-obedient subordinates should take the form of better training and of civil disciplinary
measures such as suspension or discharge from employment. The Supreme
Court was plainly right in suggesting in Raley that it would amount to
entrapment for society to train and arm men for law enforcement duties,
place them in quasi-military subordination to superiors, and then prosecute
them for conforming to plausible commands. Even if the mistake of law
defense were narrowly defined for ordinary applications, it would have to be
broadened for people placed in such circumstances. The ordinary citizen
acts on his own initiative in complying or not complying with the law. He is
not placed in a crossfire between official demand that he act aggressively
and official threat of punishment if the aggressive act, though conforming to
a plausible particularization of society's demand through superior orders, is
subsequently held to be unlawful.
There are ironies in the position taken by the Left on the Ehrlichman
defense apart from the spectacle of civil libertarians adopting a harsh
law-and-order stance against selected targets. The targets were vulnerable
without distorting the law of justification, and the net result of a successful
campaign to discredit defenses has been to reinstate aspects of present law
that should be detestable to knowledgeable civil libertarians. Ehrlichman
could not have gotten off even if the law had left open the possibility of a
good faith defense under some circumstances. All that was needed to
convict him were instructions to the jury that the good faith defense did not
extend to "unreasonable" reliance on others' legal opinions (especially
when the actor was a lawyer or legally sophisticated), that it did not extend
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to orders given outside the military context which did not purport to be legal
opinions from an impartial source, and that it most assuredly did not extend
to orders or legal opinions emanating from a fellow conspirator. 244 In
correspondence with the American Civil Liberties Union, I proffered a
simple draft which would have explicitly required such instructions. The
suggestions proved unacceptable, however, to groups already committed to
the proposition that S. 1 was not amendable.
But of course S. 1 was amendable, and the Left eventually acknowledged that by sponsoring H.R. 10850,245 its own amended version of S. 1.
In that bill, section 501 provided that the defenses specified "are not
exclusive .

.

.

.Additional bars and defenses may be developed by the

Courts of the U.S. in the light of reason and experience." 246 This departure
from the Commission Code is both vague and counterintuitive. Quite plainly, for example, the public duty defense just discussed has not been
"abolished" as the draftsmen seem to have intended. The courts are left free
to adopt whatever rule they like. The open-ended invitation to judges to add
to the listed defenses is a civil liberties monster. It was earlier urged on the
Brown Commission by the Right in order to retain all sorts of bad thingsfor example, the right of police to kill in suppressing riots and the right of a
householder to shoot to kill a supposedly burglarious intruder whether or not
he is perceived as a threat to life (as where the burglar is shot leaving the
house). To leave the judges free to define defenses is virtually to abandon
the effort to define crimes, since an offense is defined by the combination of
what it prohibits and what is declared to be justified.
B.

Repression of PoliticalDissent

The Left's position on the potential of S. 1 for repression of political
dissent was based on a number of provisions that reenacted, usually with
some amelioration, existing law. One cannot disagree with criticism directed at the overreach of existing espionage, sedition, sabotage, and riot
law; the Brown Commission proposed substantial cutbacks in these areas.
But it is quixotic to reject a multi-faceted reform code because one has not
244. The Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association supported the position
of the Judiciary Subcommittee that the Ehrlichman defense was adequately precluded by
requiring the exculpating official opinion to be "public." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 192, at 11. The proposal was inadequate in two respects. It
did not afford a defense based on superior orders rather than legal opinions, and it did not cover

the situation of orders or legal opinions necessarily given in private, as in the Barker case, but
reasonably relied on by subordinates. This portion of the Criminal Justice Section's report was
rejected by the House of Delegates on June 4, 1975. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. SUMMARY OF
ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 34 (1975).
245. H.R. 10850, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The bill was subsequently revised and
reintroduced as H.R. 12504, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
246. H.R. 10850, § 501, 94th Cong., lst Sess. (1975). S. Icontained a similar provision, S. 1 §
501, without the express invitation to the courts to develop additional defenses.
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achieved all one's desires with respect to these rarely invoked laws.
The Left's objection was primarily directed against section 1302 of S.
1, which made it a misdemeanor to "intentionally obstruct, impair, or
pervert a government function by means of physical interference or obstacle. "247 The ACLU objected that this statute
could be misused against lawful and peaceful demonstrations. Virtually
every mass demonstration would, at one moment or another, fall within
[the] prohibition. . . . [I]t would be up to the prosecutor to determine
whether a large demonstration on federal grounds or near federal
buildings was or was not "physically interfering" with some government function. Even an influx of cars carrying demonstrators to the
chosen site might constitute the proscribed felony. Since mass arrests
on the basis of group behavior are constitutionally forbidden by the
particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the statutes
would lend themselves to selective abuse by law enforcement offi2 48
cials.
A response to these criticisms must begin by noting that section 1302 of S. 1
derived from section 2421 of the Model Penal Code and section 1301 of the
Brown Commission Code; 249 thus it was not a product of a Nixonite
conspiracy. The section was designed to replace a variety of existing laws
dealing with obstructions of particular governmental operations such as "the
due administration of justice, ' 250 the activities of law enforcement and
correctional officers, 251 United States marshals and other officials serving or
executing judicial process, 25 2 the mails, 3 grain inspection 254 and military
recruiting. 255 The list is not exhaustive. Moreover, existing statutes are not
always restricted to physical obstruction; they are not always limited to
intentional obstruction; the penalties they prescribe vary irrationally; and
they rarely articulate the defense found in S. 1 that the governmental
256
activities obstructed are unlawful.
It is hard to believe that the Left knowingly sought to' legitimate
obstruction of the mails or grain inspection, of judicial decrees against racial
segregation of public schools or of judicial decrees protecting Blacks' right
247. S. 1 § 1302(a).
248. ACLU, supra note 148, at 8.
249. A significant difference, however, is that S. 1 penalized physical obstruction even of

unlawful government activity if the official was acting "in good faith." See S. I § 1302(b).
250. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970) ("endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede. . . corruptly or
by threats of force").
251. Id. §§ 1502 (law enforcement officers), 2231-33 (correctional officers).
252. Id. §§ 111, 1501.

253. Id.§ 1701.
254. 7 U.S.C. § 87(b)(8) (1970).
255. 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1970).
256. See 2 SUBCOMMrirEE REPORT 302.
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to vote. It is hard to take seriouisly the notion that because prosecutors might
abuse laws against obstruction of government, we should have no such
laws; that we should, for example, repeal traffic laws or the trespass laws,
which also can be and have been abusively employed against peaceful
demonstrators. Unfortunately the unabusable law has not yet been invented,
and we must still rely on the first and fourteenth amendments to guard
against perverted applications of otherwise useful legislation. The real
beneficiaries of the repeal of laws against the obstruction of government will
be those who oppose federal marshals enforcing the civil rights laws, those
who impede the pursuit of drug smugglers or terrorists, and those who
would sabotage the fire-fighting arrangements of a federal forest ranger.
Disorderly Conduct and Assimilated Offenses
The Brown Commission, drawing on the Model Penal Code, drafted
a narrow and precise definition of disorderly conduct and made it punishable
by fine only. 257 Rigid ideology and legal ineptitude led the Left to
reject that solution. Responding only to the notorious potential for abuse
in vaguely defined misdemeanors characterized as "disorderly conduct"
or "vagrancy," the Left proposed a section which failed to cover obvious
public disorders such as exploding stink bombs in public places, intentionally harassing passersby in public places by persistent obscenities and
intentionally rendering public highways, subway platforms or train stations
unusable by physical obstruction. 58 The Left envisioned a penal
code without any provision against "indecent exposure.' 259 These omissions were all the more imprudent because the Left's proposals also, quite
inexplicably, omitted any provision for assimilating for federal enclaves
minor offenses defined in the law of adjoining states. 260 As a result,
federal forts, reservations and the like would be converted into havens for
behavior legitimately proscribed by the surrounding communities.
Moreover, since no federal penal code will ever be enacted without an
assimilated crimes provision, the Left's rejection of decently circumscribed
federal definitions of disorderly conduct would mean that
state law definitions-often harsh and arbitrary-would replace federal
law.
C.

257. COMMISSION CODE § 1861. The section does authorize up to thirty days imprisonment

for soliciting sexual contact while loitering in a public place. Id. §§ 1861(1)(f), 3201(I)(e).
258. H.R. 10850, § 1861, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975):
A person is guilty of [disorderly conduct] if,with intent to alarm, harass, or annoy
another person or in reckless disregard of the fact that another person is thereby
alarmed, harassed, or annoyed, he engages in violent, tumultuous, or threatening

conduct.
259. There was no analog in H.R. 10850 to Commission Code § 1852, which limits the
misdemeanor to situations where the indecent exposure would alarm or seriously offend the

unwilling onlooker.
260. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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Anti-LibertarianProposalsfrom the Left

The tunnel vision that sees legislation only from the point of view of
potential abuse or of yesterday's Watergate headlines led the Left to make
proposals of extraordinary severity and repressiveness. For example, the
Left proposed to penalize disobedience of a court order by a maximum of
two years imprisonment. 261 Only liberals with a short memory could thus
undertake to subvert the Brown Commission's effort to restrict the tyranny
of punishment for judicial contempt.262 Obviously the draftsman was
reacting angrily to recent disobedience of court orders in desegregation
cases. He was not thinking of disobedience of injunctions against strikes
or picketing.
Similarly, the proposal to make it a felony for officials to "deceive
the public"263 is an astounding measure to be born among civil libertarians.
Is it really desired that, notwithstanding the first amendment,
criminal courts become the forum for testing the validity of public
pronouncements about defense needs and plans, crop prospects, food and
drug research, inflation, unemployment and housing? Who but a General
Stillwell or a Daniel Ellsberg would be targets of such prosecutions? Are
we so naive as to believe that the FBI must always announce accurately
its suspects and intentions in a proposed drive on organized crime or that
public announcements on international relations accurately reflect sympathies? Should civil libertarians leap to espouse criminal law solutions
for problems much better handled by disciplining or dismissing faithless
public employees, or just by public discussion?
E.

Compromise Rejected: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory

By August, 1975, under the influence of liberal Senators Hart of
Michigan, Kennedy of Massachusetts and Abourezk of South Dakota, a
considerable amelioration of S. 1 had been accepted by the Right. 264 In
the spring of 1976 a final push by the same group of senators was
remarkably successful in gaining new concessions sufficient to render S.
1 a proper vehicle for reform of the federal criminal code. The "STOP S.
261. H.R. 10850, §§ 1335, 2301(a)(4).
262. The Commission Code limits imprisonment for contempt to six months. CoMMissIoN
CODE § 1341(2).
263. H.R. 10850, § 1346(a):

A non-elected public servant is guilty of an offense if he, with intent to deceive the
public, makes a false, fictitious or fraudulent and material oral or written statement
or representation about any matter within the jurisdiction . . . of a department or
agency of the United States.
264. See S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), which was reported to the full Committee on
October 21, 1975. The bill was reprinted under date of April 1, 1976, and was accompanied by a'
draft Committee report bearing the same date. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
supra note 116.
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1" campaign had been so effective that it had become apparent to the
Right that reform would founder unless they compromised. Senator
Hruska was to retire at the end of the Ninety-fourth Congress, and
Senator McClellan had only two more years to the end of his last term.
Both men viewed reform of the penal code as intrinsically important and
as a fitting crown to their legislative careers. Pragmatic politicians, they
were prepared to give up on most of the provisions that stood in the way
of the Senate passing a reform bill. In addition, the Administration,
through Attorney General Levi, issued a statement welcoming "accommodation. '"265 Concessions from the Right 266 included the following:
(1) There was to be a "new bill"; the reform bill would no longer
carry the hated designation S. 1. Although this looks like a pure formality, it
was not. It was a politically significant symoblic act; the Right was
striking its flag, and the Left would be given its triumph without having to
eat its hard words about the unamendability of the McClellan bill.
267
(2) The "official secrets" provisions would be dropped.
268
(3) Sentencing maxima would be substantially lowered.
(4) Provision for capital punishment would be dropped, 269 deferring
the issue to separate disposition after the Supreme Court's decision of
pending cases challenging the constitutionality of that penalty and the
procedures for imposing it. 270
(5) Section 3714 relating to admissibility at trial of eyewitness
identification notwithstanding improper pre-identification influences by
the police would be dropped. The analogous section 3713 relating to
admissibility of "voluntary" confessions by uncounseled suspects in
police custody would be qualified by an introductory clause: "unless
otherwise required by the Constitution.' '271
(6) Substantial limitations were accepted on existing legislation (on
272
the books since the jittery days of 1917) dealing with wartime sabotage.
(7) Possession of "small amounts" (under ten grams) of marijuana
265. Department of Justice, Press Release (April 6, 1976).
266. See Memorandum from Senators McClellan and Hruska to Senators Hart, Kennedy
and Abourezk (March 25, 1976). This memorandum was written in response to a compromise
proposal circulated by Senators Hart, Kennedy and Abourezk on March 8, 1976, which was
itself a response to a memorandum from Senators Mansfield and Scott to Senators McClellan,
Hruska, Hart and Kennedy dated February 9,1976.
267. Id. at 3-4. See notes 139-49 supra and accompanying text.
268. Memorandum, supra note 266, at 5. See notes 160-76 supra and accompanying text.
269. Memorandum, supra note 266, at 5; see S.1 §§ 2401-2403.
270. The Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), would seem to
sustain the constitutionality of the S. I proposals on capital punishment.
271. Memorandum, supra note 266, at 6.
272. Id.at 3; see S. I §§ 1101, 1112, 1114.
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would be decriminalized.2 73
(8) The constitutional remnant, if any, of the Smith Act, 274 directed
against advocacy of violent overthrow of the government, was abandoned;
there would be no "reaffirmation" of this dubious bit of existing
law. 275 This concession was all the more remarkable in that it went
beyond the Brown Commission, which, out of political prudence, had
contented itself with erecting safeguards against application of the Smith
Act in contravention of the first amendment.2 76
(9) Defenses, other than the noncontroversial mistake of fact defense,
would be dropped from the bill, leaving them to judicial development on a
case-by-case basis.2 7 7 For reasons previously stated, 271 this was
a blow to the integrity of the Code, but it represented substantial concession
from the Right. It meant, for example, abandoning the proposed
repeal of the insanity defense 279 and the attempt to codify the law on
20
entrapment. 1
On the last two points, insanity and entrapment, the Left could hardly
congratulate itself since the judge-made law to which the issues would be
remitted was no more favorable to their views than the proposed statutory
text. Down the legislative drain with these proposals went other less controversial justification provisions such as self-defense 28 ' and defense of
property. 28 2 In these bypassed areas lurked such long-standing, nasty problems as whether or not an attacked person must make a safe retreat rather
than kill his assailant, whether taking life is ever justifiable in defense of
property, and whether policemen may, when it seems necessary, kill to
effect arrests or prevent escapes. Regrettably, the Left, 28 3 the Right, 28 4 the
American Bar Association 285 and the Special Committee of the Judicial
Conference of the United States on the Administration of the Criminal
Law 286 all agreed that most of these issues were inappropriate for legislative
resolution.
273. Memorandum, supra note 266, at 4; see S. I § 1813(c)(2), making possession of
marijuana a misdemeanor punishable by up to thirty days imprisonment. S. 1 § 2301(b)(8).
274. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970).
275. Memorandum, supra note 266, at 2.
276. See COMMISSION CODE § 1103, Comment.

277. Memorandum, supra note 266, at 2.
278. See text accompanying text note 246 supra.
279. See notes 150-56 supra and accompanying text.

280. See notes 212-14 supra and accompanying text.
281. S. 1 § 542.
282. Id. § 543.

283. See H.R. 10850, § 501. See note 246 supra and accompanying text.
284. See S. 1 §.501 ("defenses to prosecution set forth in this chapter are not exclusive").
285. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 192, at 6 ("No
attempt should be made . . . to set forth . . . all defenses").

286. COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 7 (Feb. 25, 1976).
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Rejected by Senators McClellan and Hruska were the following: (1)
total repeal of the federal obscenity laws; (2) abandonment of the interstate
commerce jurisdiction over riots; and (3) deletion of mandatory prison
sentences for hard drug traffickers.2 8 7 On the issue of wiretapping, where
most of the Left was demanding outright repeal, the liberal senators made
politically more realistic demands for restricting the practice with regard to
offenses covered, warrantless eavesdropping in "emergencies," "national
security" taps and the like. The conservative senators did not refuse to
negotiate on these proposals.
But for the Left there was no need to await the outcome of such
negotiations. An ACLU press release on April 8, 1976, declared: "The
'hard-line' attitude of the two leading sponsors of this legislation lends little
hope that S. 1 can be successfully overhauled during this session of Congress. The ACLU must therefore reaffirm its commitment to oppose Senate
Bill 1 in its present form.'"288 That statement was relatively mild. It implicitly recognized the amendability of S. 1 by expressing opposition to the bill
only "in its present form." The ACLU's then-Washington Executive Director, Charles Morgan, had previously gone much further in an article in the
Washington Star, denouncing the actions in the Senate as "A 'Compromise' That Lynches the Constitution. '289 He took the position that no civil
liberties issue could be deferred, and that all reform must await congressional agreement with the whole program of the ACLU, including repeal of
wiretapping and obscenity laws, revision of existing espionage law and
repeal of the law penalizing knowing misrepresentation by witnesses in
governmental matters. 290 No better formula could be devised for indefinitely
postponing penal reform. Such brave progressive words meant, in the real
world of legislation, a reactionary refusal to move forward. As for less
responsible journals and journalists, the prospect of compromise had them
foaming at the mouth. The Los Angeles Vanguard of June 4, 1976 headlined a five-column article entitled "Fascist Bill Creeps Thru Senate.''291
The article characterized the bill, including pending changes, as "One Giant
Goosestep for Mankind!," "the most evil legacy of the Nixon administration, Watergate taken to its most extreme law 'n order conclusion," and
287. Memorandum, supra note 266, at 4-5. See Hart/Kennedy/Abourezk Proposal, supra

note 266. Federal jurisdiction over riots had already been somewhat curtailed by S. 1 §§
1831-1833, and a further curtailment was accepted by Senators McClellan and Hruska who

agreed to delete "obstruction of a federal function" as a basis for federal jurisdiction.
Memorandum, supra note 266, at 4.
288. ACLU Press Release, April 8, 1976, at 1.
289. Morgan, A "Compromise" That Lynches the Constitution, Washington Star, Feb. 29,
1976, at E-1, colI.1.
290. Id.
291. Baker, Fascist Bill Creeps Thru Senate, Los Angeles Vanguard, June 4, 1976, at 3, col.
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"blueprint for fascism." The role of the "so-called liberals" (Senators
Kennedy, Hart and Abourezk) was described as driving NCARL officials
"purple with rage."
Nevertheless, compromise remains very much alive. It now appears
that the recently introduced McClellan-Kennedy bill, no longer designated
292
S. 1, will be the vehicle of reform in the Ninety-fifth Congress.

VI.

THE MEDIA

With a few honorable exceptions, 293 journalists and broadcasters
defaulted on their obligation to educate the public on the issues of penal
reform. The behavior of the Wall Street Journal, ordinarily a sophisticated
paper, is illustrative. Responding to a letter from Senators McClellan and
Hruska, 294 the Journal published an editorial which focused on
the official secrets issue, 295 the length of the bill ("every Senator and
Representative will [not] read all 753 pages"), 296 and the desirability of
"codification" as distinguished from reform (the bill "should not go
297
beyond existing law").
The official secrets issue was indeed important, but to give it
overwhelming prominence, as did most of the press, was also an act of
censorship denying the public, at critical stages of the legislative process,
2 98
intelligence regarding all the other important proposals in the legislation.
292. See S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
293. See, e.g., Conley, The Growing Fight over Senate Bill 1, Memphis Com. Appeal, Jan.
I1, 1976, § 6, at 1, col. 1; McKenzie, New Criminal Code, Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1975, at 1,
col. 6; Ungar, Reports and Comment: Law and Order Revisited, 238 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 12
(1976). I obviously have not made a comprehensive survey on this subject; but colleagues,
former students and friends involved in the reform enterprise clipped the press for me, and
called my attention to broadcasts. I am satisfied that the conclusion in the text is valid at least
for the northeastern United States.
294. Letters to the Editor: CriminalJustice, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1975, at 8, col. 6.
295. Review and Outlook: Senate 1, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1975, at 8, col. 1.
296. Id. The Journal appears to have adopted page count as its paramount criterion in
evaluating legislation. A lead editorial called upon President Ford to veto the Tax Reform Act
of 1976 on the ground that it was 1500 pages long. The President was invited to promote his
campaign for reelection "by having his advisers draw up a tax bill on one type-written page."
Review and Outlook: Veto the Tax Bill, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1976, at 26, col. 1.
297. Review and Outlook: Senate 1, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1975, at 8, col. I (statement from
the Montreal meeting of the American Bar Association House of Delegates).
298. It should be stated that the New York Times, as well as many other papers, gave
comprehensive news coverage to the initial submission of the Brown Commission Report and to
the introduction of S. 1. But these early summaries, written before battle lines had been drawn,
could not supply the need later for reasonably comprehensive analysis of the fighting issues.
The New York Times at one point commissioned an article to survey the reform project, but
found it too complicated for the Times readership. It was eventually published in Gillers,
Blueprint for Tyranny: Congress Overhauls the Laws, 222 NATION 172 (1976). The New York
Times did run a short piece by me in the Sunday Week in Review Section. The editors,
however, made a significant change. Where I had given first place to the sentencing reforms, to
avoid the by-then-hackneyed priority which the newspapers had been giving to the newspaper-
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The proposition that comprehensive penal reform should be
rejected because the bill was too long and would not be read by every
legislator was, of course, ridiculous. The Journal was doing nothing less
than mis-educating its readers regarding the democratic legislative process.
If no bill could be enacted unless every legislator had read every
page, legislation would come to a halt. Responsible legislators make up
their minds on the basis of staff condensations and salient issues exposed
by hearings, lobbying and public discussion. The President of the United
States, who must concur in or veto every enactment of Congress, would
find it impossible to exercise this legislative discretion if he were required
to read (and think about?) every word in the tens of thousands of pages
submitted to him every year. Tax bills of greater length than the criminal
code reform bills are enacted regularly. 299 In any event, two-thirds of S. 1
consisted either of conforming amendments that raised no substantive
issues or of reenactments of existing procedural and administrative provisions. Of the remaining one-third of the bill, which deals with the new
substantive penal code, by far the major part was not in dispute.
As for codification-a mere tidying-up or editorial restatement of
existing law-it is enough to recall that the statute establishing the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws called explicitly
for "revision, .... improvement" and "changes" such as would
"better serve the ends of justice." 3°° It would have been a waste of time
and money to marshal the political and intellectual resources that have
gone into this enterprise over the past eight years merely to restate
existing law, an editorial job that the Library of Congress or any law
publisher could perform satisfactorily.
A surprising aspect of the press coverage of penal reform was the
extent to which journals of no marked political bent opened their news.
columns to handouts from the Left. A Boston Globe article reported that
continued compromise efforts would cause Senator Kennedy to "lose
points" with liberal supporters and that the Senator had therefore decided
3
to withdraw his support of penal reform through amendment of S. 1. 01
pinching censorship provisions, the editors gave my discussion of official secrets first place

prominence. See Schwartz, A Proposal to Overhaul the Federal CriminalLaws, N.Y. Times,
June 22, 1975, § 4, at 4, col. 3.
299. See, e.g., H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975). The Tax Reform Act of 1976 was
over 1700 pages long in the print passed by the Senate on Aug. 6, 1976. The Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 (H.R. 8300) in its second reading for the Senate, March 23, 1954, consisted of 875
pages plus 418 pages of amendments.
300. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
301. Wermiel, Kennedy PullingBack on Crime Code Bill, Boston Globe, April 21, 1976, at 2,

col. 2. But cf. Editorial: Stop Stalling on S. 1, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 31, 1976, at 6, col.
1 (editorial in a paper which had strongly criticized S. I now noting that the campaign against S.

I "shows signs of continuing long after the fulfillment of its basic objective, which was to strip
S. I of questionable provisions...").
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Similarly, the Detroit Free Press urged Senator Hart to "prevent a
questionable compromise from being passed." ' 30 2 Harpers Magazine ran
an article purporting to survey the issues raised by S. 1, apparently
3°3
without consulting anybody but the violent opposition.
There is much food for reflection here. The reasons for the media's
poor performance lie deep in the structure of our society, and there is
enough blame for all. Instead of blaming, however, we should ask
ourselves what can be done to encourage the press to handle complex
politico-legal issues so as to assist rather than preempt choices by the
public. This is not the place to do more than indicate lines of action to be
explored. One possibility would be for the organized bar or law teacher
groups to provide a legislative analysis service of the sort that the
Association of American Law Schools has provided for interpretation of
Supreme Court decisions. Another alternative would be for local bar
associations, guided and stimulated by the American Bar Association, to
foster the flow of information from law to journalism through joint
committees which would summarize and explain local and national legal
developments. Law faculties could usefully collaborate with such committees.
For journalists, three innovations suggest themselves. First, a tradition
of serial feature articles for handling areas of vast, perennial conflict
such as criminal law, tax law, environmental law and welfare law could
be developed. Second, education for journalists should include a large
component of law, criminal and constitutional at least. Third, journalists'
emphasis on the importance of accuracy of "facts"-propositions that
can be objectively verified 3 -- should be balanced by inculcating in them
a sense of the "unknowability" of many propositions in the realm of law,
economics, sociology and politics. For such areas journalists-to-be
should have a mild innoculation of the lawyers' "adversary system"; that
is, they should learn to tell the story less in terms of conclusions, whether
of the journalist or others, than in terms of clash of evidence, logic and
interest on opposing sides.
Finally, one may express the hope that general education, certainly
at the college level if not in high schools, would impart some sense of the
flux, compromise and growth which are basic to democratic law. A
readership so educated would demand better of the press.
302. As We See It: PhilHart and S-1, Detroit Free Press, April 17, 1976, § A, at 6, col. 1.
303. Viorst, Nixon's Revenge: A Bill to Legalize Watergate, 252 HARPERS MAGAZINE 17
(Jan. 15, 1976).
304. One of the most baneful consequences of an undiscriminating adherence to this
criterion is the tendency of some journalists to publicize a tendentious proposition by reporting
"accurately" that someone, particularly an "expert," made a declaration on the subject. The
important issue of the truth or falsity of the proposition gets lost under the surface truth that the
declaration was made.
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VII.

PROSPECTS

The prospects are good for enacting a new federal penal code in the
next several years. One may hope that the next drafters will start from the
Commission Code, superimposing on it improvements developed in the
course of the Senate Subcommittee's hearings and studies. Tactically, it
would be well to shorten the bill drastically by separating out the substantive
code for initial passage, with a proviso that it should not go into
effect until after enactment of a companion bill embodying the numerous
technical conforming amendments required to integrate the bill into the
United States Code.
The new code will include few, if any, of the repressive features that
have been identified above. It will not, of course, enact the Left's entire
program. Federal law will continue to ban hard-core pornography, although
federal jurisdiction may be restricted to federal enclaves, to
substantial multi-state operations or to "engaging in the business" of
disseminating strictly defined erotic materials. The wiretapping law, if
not dissected out of the reform project (leaving the matter to existing law
and amendment by independent legislation), will probably be cut back.
Capital punishment, given a new lease on life by the recent Supreme
Court decisions, 30 5 will probably be retained in some narrow applications
such as killings by life prisoners, airplane hijackers or political terrorists.
Handgun control will move forward another inadequate notch. The federal
criminal investigative agencies may succeed in blocking the Brown
Commission's innovative proposal to confine them to matters of substantial
federal concern. 30 6 The regulatory establishment zealously opposed to
pollution, adulteration, untried drugs and other dangers that beset mankind
but largely insensitive to abuses of criminal justice, will fight to
retain criminal liability without fault and to suppress the Brown Commission's model provision for sensible restraint in criminal enforcement of
administrative regulations. 3 7 The subtle problems of justification and
excuse will be sidestepped.
Despite shortcomings, enactment of the new Code would be the
miracle of progress to which I referred in the opening of this Article.
Criminal law would take a substantial step towards rationality and respectability. Maximum punishments would be cut back in the direction of
humane and realistic limits. Penal policy would be subjected to legislative
guidelines. Judicial discretion would be subject to appellate review.
305. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
306. COMMISSION CODE § 207 (dropped in S. 1).
307. COMMISSION CODE § 1006 (omitted in S. 1). The Left's proposal contains a provision
making no distinction between innocent and willful violations, prescribing six months maximum
imprisonment even where existing law carried a lower maximum! See H.R.10850, 94th Cong.,
Ist Sess. § 1304(a)(2), (a)(3) (1975) (misusing governmental authority).
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Modern definition and grading of offenses would facilitate proper law
enforcement. Substituting order and system for the present chaos of
overlapping, inconsistent and antiquated statutes would make it easier in
the future to identify defects and make particular improvements consistent
with the overall aims and capacities of the system. The federal penal
law would become an influential and beneficent model for state reforms.
It is a paradox that progress will have been achieved not only despite
the undiscriminating obstructionism of the Left that I have recounted, but
also in part because of those deplorable tactics. Had the program of the
Right gone through, as well it might have since there was so much in S. 1
that was good, the price of reform would have been too high. It is
improbable that S. 1 could have been stopped by sweet reason in the
political arena or in the press. I reluctantly confront the perennial ethical
problem of good ends being served by bad means. Having nothing new to
add to that endless debate, I take an existential escape: the professor's
role is to speak as truly as he can. He is not responsible for enacting or
blocking legislation. The civil liberties establishment, on the other hand,
does have such responsibilities. Like an attorney-advocate, it need not
believe in the immaculate virtue of its client. There are ethical and
intellectual limits to advocacy, but the boundaries are far from precisely
defined, and "[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence
of an uplifted knife." 308 I shall not cancel my life-long membership in the
ACLU.
One can dream of possibilities in legislation, criminal administration
and political leadership that go well beyond the range of this Article. How
refreshing it would be if the new President, as he signed the criminal law
reform bill, should declare:
This is not a Safe Streets Act. Criminal laws are a secondary,
although essential, protection against violent crime, and the states
rather than the federal government are primarily responsible for
physical security on the streets and in the homes. Of greater significance than criminal law, in the long run, is the confidence of all
segments of the community that our system is fair and benevolent:
fair in the distribution of income, fair in the assessment of taxes and
other burdens, benevolent in its concern for the vital needs of every
person and benevolent in its respect for individual freedom. This
new federal criminal code promotes respect for law by its rationality,
by its safeguards against discrimination and arbitrary punishment, and
by eliminating
obsolete
and
technical
obstructions
to
effective law enforcement. Along with other reforms, it may make a
contribution to a more tranquil life in city and countryside. We don't
know that it will because, despite prodigious efforts in universities
308. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
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and government, the causes of crime are very poorly understood and
"cures" for crime virtually unknown. But if we cannot look to
today's legislation to "solve the crime problem," we shall at least
have cleared away ancient and ugly grievances against the system.
This modest, and therefore honest, declaration might well be accompanied by a few measures that would put future reforms on a solid
footing. Among these, the highest priority might be given to establishing
a credible system of criminal statistics. The existing system is a scandal.30 9
It depends almost exclusively on crimes reported to the police or
on arrest statistics. The very categories used in reporting crimes-larceny,
robbery, burglary, fraud--embrace such a broad range of behavior, from
the trivial to the most dangerous, that reporting in such categories reflects the nature and gravity of crime only with intolerable
margins of error. 310 Since the overwhelming majority of crimes are not
reported to police, since the number of arrests made is largely a function
of fluctuating police policy, and since the numbers have frequently been
manipulated by reporting police departments to make themselves look
better, the country is operating in a state of basic ignorance. We cannot be
sure, for example, how much of the huge reported increase in crime in
recent years reflects changes in the reporting system, monetary inflation
that converts formerly petty thefts into reportable felonies or even such
beneficent developments as a greater readiness of Blacks, emerging into
the mainstream of American life, to report crimes to the police. It is time
to establish a national crime census, based on scientific sampling of the
general population, to ascertain the number of actual victimizations in a
given period. 3 11 Such data could be supplemented by reports from employers, insurance companies and other institutions, and from the armed
forces, regarding those vast pools of unreported theft and aggression on
the docks, in the warehouses, in the banks and in department stores. It is
only by regarding the phenomenon of crime with unflinching concentration
and acceptance of the full truth-as if we were epidemiologists bent
309. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
supra note 11, at 20-27; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 123-37 (1967).
310. A scientific approach to measuring the severity of offenses has begun. See T. SELLIN &
M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964); Wolfgang, Figlio & Thornberry,

Comparative Community Standards and Perceptions of Seriousness (major pending study
financed by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration).
311.

Cf. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

supra note 11, at 20 (results of first national survey of crime victimization). See also U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION & NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
INFORMATION AND STATISTICS SERVICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES-A
NATIONAL CRIME PANEL SURVEY REPORT (1976) (comparison of victimization rates for 1973 and

1974).
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on wiping out smallpox in India-that we can aspire to understanding and
control.
Other promising paths of advance would include: (1) providing
further guidance for the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing by
developing "presumptive sentences" for typical situations, along lines
recently advocated by Senators Kennedy and Hart;3 12 (2) creating in the
Department of Justice a permanent criminal justice research unit to follow
legislative, judicial and administrative developments throughout the nation
and the world, and to act as a clearinghouse for information and
suggestions to the states; (3) experimenting with the correctional system
by, for example, making disciplined labor on public works the central
experience; (4) developing some alternative to the faltering juvenile
delinquency laws for removing violent young aggressives from the environments which they terrorize; and (5) introducing into the law of justifi3 13
cation and excuse the concept of a margin for non-criminal error.
would guide by the
As Mr. Justice Brandeis said long ago, "If 1we
34
light of reason, we must let our minds be bold."
312. S. 204, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976); cf. M. FRANKEL, supra note 48, at 111-15;
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976) (directed by Prof. Alan Dershowitz); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE

CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration) (1976).
313. See COMMISSION CODE § 608 (dropped in S. I § 521). Under present law, for example, a
person who would have been justified in shooting in self-defense or shooting a nighttime
intruder may be convicted of criminal homicide if he was marginally hasty or marginally

"unreasonable" in his appraisal of the situation. Such a legal arrangement makes the difference
between heroism and criminality paper-thin. The criminal law is more properly reserved for

egregious misbehavior. Compare the difference between negligence for purposes of tort recov-

ery and "criminal negligence," or between civil and criminal fraud. That principle of frugality
in the use of criminal sanctions is as apt on the justification issues as it is on the prohibition
issues.
314. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

